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       Abstract  
 This working paper provides a longitudinal perspective on the business history of solar 
energy between the nineteenth century and the present day. Its covers early attempts to develop 
solar energy, the use of passive solar in architecture before World War 2, and the subsequent 
growth of the modern photovoltaic industry. It explores the role of entrepreneurial actors, 
sometimes motivated by broad social and environmental agendas, whose strategies to build 
viable business models proved crucially dependent on two exogenous factors: the prices of 
alternative conventional fuels and public policy. Supportive public policies in various 
geographies facilitated the commercialization of photovoltaic technologies, but they also 
encouraged rent-seeking and inefficiencies, while policy shifts resulted in a regular boom and 
bust cycle. The perceived long-term potential of solar energy, combined with the capital-
intensity and cyclical nature of the industry, led to large electronics, oil and engineering 
companies buying entrepreneurial firms in successive generations. These firms became 
important drivers of innovation and scale, but they also found solar to be an industry in which 
achieving a viable business model proved a chimera, whilst waves of creative destruction 
became the norm. 
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“Power from Sunshine”1: A Business History of Solar Energy* 
 
Introduction  
 This working paper reviews the business history of solar energy from the nineteenth 
century to the present. It forms part of a wider project to reconstruct the history of “green” 
entrepreneurship. A companion paper published has reviewed the business history of wind 
energy. It tracked the idiosyncratic global distribution of wind energy capacity over time, and 
debated the relative importance of visionary entrepreneurs and public policy in shaping the 
corporate structure of the industry.2  
 The history of solar contains similarities to wind energy, but also considerable 
differences. Like wind, the sun is an obvious source of energy, which has long attracted interest, 
primarily as a source of heat. Like wind also, but even more dramatically, solar energy has never 
lived up to the potential which its adherents claimed.  Even today, as Appendix Table 1 shows, 
Germany and Spain are the only countries where solar energy accounts for more than 1 per cent 
of the electricity generated. Although the sun shined everywhere on the planet, the spatial 
distribution of solar energy capacity has been highly skewed, and not well correlated with 
resource endowment. Cloudy Germany has more photovoltaic capacity installed than the rest of 
the world combined. (Appendix Table 2) Manufacture of photovoltaic (PV) cells has also been 
highly skewed. After being primarily concentrated in the United States for decades, two-thirds of 
production is now in Asia. (Appendix Tables 3 and 4) 
 Unlike wind, however, the technology of solar energy experienced a fundamental re-
invention following the development of the photovoltaic cell (PV) after World War 2. This 
resulted in the creation of a far more capital and science-intensive industry than wind energy. 
The contemporary PV solar industry came to consist of three separate sectors.3 The first is wafer, 
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cell and module production, the primary focus of this working paper. The second is the 
installation of such solar cells. The third is the manufacture of polysilicon, the primary raw 
material used to manufacture PV cells. Polysilicon was the vital component for the new 
electronics industry which emerged after the invention of the transitor, because it was a 
semiconductor whose electrical characteristics could be precisely adjusted. Until the turn of the 
century the solar industry sourced supplies of polysilicon from the byproducts produced for 
electronic use. 
 The development of solar energy on a commercial basis turned out to be a lengthy 
process whose progress was primarily shaped by the price and cost of alternative conventional 
energy sources. Solar was especially vulnerable to the price of competitor sources of energy as it 
emerged as the most expensive renewable energy. Innovation was driven by visionary 
entrepreneurs, all of whom faced the problem that PV solar was a highly capital-intensive and 
technologically-complex product. This led them to seek investments from large established firms 
in cognate industries, especially electronics and petroleum, and to rely on public policy to 
facilitate the growth of the industry. This reliance on large firms and governments was to turn 
out to be problematic. 
  
Solar before Photovoltaic Cells  
 The idea of using the power of the sun for heating and lighting was intuitive.  Passive 
solar energy has been used as a form of light and heat since early mankind. In the 5th century 
B.C., the ancient Greeks designed their homes to capture the sun’s heat during the winter. Later, 
the Romans improved on solar architecture by covering south-facing windows with clear 
materials such as mica or glass, preventing the escape of solar heat captured during the day. In 
the 1760s, the Swiss scientist Horace de Saussure built an insulated rectangular box with a glass 
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cover that became the prototype for solar collectors used to heat water.4  
 During 19th century, inventors and entrepreneurs in Europe and the U.S. developed solar 
energy technologies that would form the basis of modern designs. In 1839, nineteen-year-old 
Edmund Becquerel, a French experimental physicist, discovered the photovoltaic effect while 
experimenting with an electrolytic cell made up of two metal electrodes. Becquerel found that 
certain materials would produce small amounts of electric current when exposed to light.5 Later, 
in 1878, a solar-powered steam engine was invented by a French mathematician, August 
Mouchet, after receiving funding from the French government to work on an alternative source 
of energy. He created the first solar steam-powered plant using parabolic dish collectors. The 
plant was a central attraction of the World Exposition in Paris in 1878. This method of creating 
solar energy is still used today, although the French government didn’t provide further funding 
as it was deemed too expensive.6 There was enormous interest in the potential of solar energy 
over the following decades. Between 1880 and 1914 one estimate is that there were almost fifty 
articles on solar energy published in Scientific American, the influential popular science 
magazine.7 
It was another matter to develop the commercial use the use of solar energy at a time 
when fossil fuels were cheap and widely available, and the downsides of their use not 
understood. The first entrepreneurial endeavors in solar, then, took place in particular locations 
where using the sun rather than coal made greater sense. During the 1890s several solar water 
heater companies were started in California, which had a lot of sun and no coal. The first hot 
water heaters were simply bare metal tanks turned towards the sun. In 1891 Clarence Kemp 
invented his Climax solar water heater, which put his water tanks inside a pine box fronted with 
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glass, and trapped the heat from the sun. By 1900 1,600 of these heaters had been sold in 
southern California.8 In 1908 William J. Bailey, a former mechanical engineer at the Carnegie 
Steel Company who had moved to California for health reasons, invented a solar thermal 
collector. He separated the solar water heater into two parts: a heating element exposed to the 
sun and an insulated storage unit tucked away in the house so families could have sun heated 
water day and night and early the next morning. The heating element consisted of pipes attached 
to a black-painted metal sheet placed in a glass-covered box. Because the water to be heated 
passed through narrow pipes rather than sat in a large tank, Bailey reduced the volume of water 
exposed to the sun and therefore the water heated up faster. Providing hotter water for longer 
periods put Bailey's solar hot water heater, called the Day and Night, at a great advantage over 
the competition. From 1909, when Bailey started up his business, in 1918, his company had sold 
more than 4,000 Day and Night Solar Hot Water Heaters.9 
 Another early solar entrepreneur was Aubrey Eneas, who had emigrated from Britain to 
Boston. After settling in Boston, Eneas drew inspiration from another immigrant John Ericsson, 
the Swiss-born engineer whose design for the ironclad steam-powered battleship The Monitor 
was widely publicized during the American Civil War. Eneas founded the Solar Motor Company 
of Boston in 1892.  He perceived an opportunity in the arid deserts of the American southwest, 
where a growing need for steam-powered irrigation and lack of easily accessible (and therefore 
cheap) coal presented a great opportunity for solar power. After unsuccessful experiments, Eneas 
adopted Mouchot’s conical reflector design to heat the boiler more evenly and efficiently, 
producing a greater volume of steam.  In 1903 Eneas relocated the Solar Motor Company from 
Boston to Los Angeles and began aggressively marketing his machine throughout the region.10 
He developed large solar collectors to power steam engines and pumps for agricultural irrigation 
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water, and started selling all around California and Arizona. Unfortunately, the construction 
methods of these large cone collectors did not resist the strong and unpredictable local weather 
with hail and strong winds. Eneas eventually withdrew from solar energy believing the costs 
were too high to make a profit.11  
 Eneas was not alone in leaving solar business. During the 1920’s Bailey, responding to 
the growing supply of cheap natural gas in California, switched to making gas-powered hot 
water heaters. However his technology was taken up in Florida, where gas was not as cheap as 
Florida. A real-estate boom during the early 1920s open up a market for solar water heating 
technologies. The Florida patent rights to the Day and Night technology were purchased by the 
owner of a building company, Bud Carruthers, who later launched the Solar Water Heater 
Company in Miami. Within a few years the majority of houses in Miami were equipped with the 
technology. The company expanded so fast that it occupied an entire block of the city within two 
years. However the success was short-lived, in 1926 the company failed following a massive 
hurricane and the end of the Florida’s building boom. There was a second solar boom in Florida 
after 1935, when Federal Housing Administration mortgage programs facilitated a housing book 
in which solar heaters were widely installed. However rising copper prices after the outbreak of 
the Pacific War ended this boom.12 
 It was in the developing, rather than the developed world, where more ambitious schemes 
were launched. The first attempt at harvesting energy from the sun in a developing country was 
initiated by William Adams in the 1870s; an engineer who served as deputy registrar of the High 
Court at Bombay. Before leaving Britain for his post in India, Adams served in the British patent 
office in London, a position that triggered his interest in energy technology and its recent 
developments. Adams accumulated through these years a tremendous amount of information on 
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energy technologies, including solar energy. He was particularly interested by Mouchot’s 
research. In the introduction to a book he published in Bombay in 1878 called Solar Heat: A 
Substitute Fuel in Tropical Countries, Adams wrote about Mouchot’s discoveries: 
“This idea may be, and probably is, purely Utopian, but very important discoveries have been 
made in striving for the impossible; and if no further success is achieved than that of utilizing the 
rays of the sun for driving stationary steam engines, an important addition to physical science 
will have been made, and a great commercial revolution will have been effected.”13 
 Adams came up with a plan to use concentrated sunlight to make the kind of high-
pressure steam needed to run modern steam engines. When the first boilers imported from 
Britain were installed and running, Adams spent a few months perfecting his technology to 
increase the steam production capacity of his boilers. However the colonial government was 
extremely skeptical that solar heat could be scaled up for use in commercial, large-scale 
purposes.  The government engineers noted that the limited power storage capacity of Adam’s 
machines meant that workers had to arrive well before dawn to get the boilers started, and had to 
be sent back home when the sun wasn’t strong enough. In response to this criticism, Adams 
argued – unsuccessfully - that solar energy could supplement coal, which was imported from 
Britain and costly.14  
 Adams frustration prompted him to abandon further experiments and focus on writing his 
book. His research, however, sparked the interest of officials in other British colonies with hot 
climates and no fossil fuels. Aden, for example, faced both these issues, and in addition faced a 
scarcity of potable water, which had to be distilled from seawater, and sold at an expensive price. 
Local engineers adapted Adams’ apparatus successfully and used it to produce drinking water 
until cheap oil from the Arabian peninsula replaced coal after the WWII.15 
7	
	
 The greatest progress in the use of solar power was in the British protectorate of Egypt, 
where the American entrepreneur Frank Shuman established a solar business. Shuman was a 
Philadelphia inventor who had become rich through inventing a shatter-proof glass used for 
skylights, car windshields, goggles and machine tool guards. Shuman began experimenting with 
solar motors in 1906.  Well aware of Eneas’s failures a few years earlier, Shuman worked on a 
simpler, sturdier, less-expensive design for a solar engine. After a year of lab experiments, in the 
summer of 1907 Shuman built a small-scale demonstration plant in his backyard. To promote his 
solar motor and trigger interest among potential investors, Shuman circulated advertisements 
throughout the city inviting the public to attend a demonstration of the sun machine. By 1910, in 
order to test his design Shuman built on his compound, a plant roughly 10 times the size of the 
original installation, the total sun collection area was more than 10,000 square feet. It produced 
around 600 pounds of steam per hour, and generated 25 horsepower—enough to pump 3000 
gallons of water per minute to a height of 33 feet.16   
 Shuman was convinced he could make a breakthrough in commercial solar power. In 
order to compete with coal, Shuman thought, a solar plants would need to be much larger. He 
was soon envisaging 10,000 horsepower steam engines run by sun collectors covering 60 acres.17 
In September 1911 he wrote in Scientific American: 
“The future development of solar power has no limit. Where great natural water powers exist, 
sun power cannot compete; but sun-power generators will, in the near future, displace all other 
forms of mechanical power over at least 10 per cent of the earth’s land surface; and in the far 
distant future, natural fuels having been exhausted it will remain as the only means of existence 
of the human race.”18 
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Building on alarmist newspaper headlines predicted an imminent energy crisis due to shortages 
of coal and petroleum, he described an exciting solar future where “deserts in remote corners of 
the world could be made to bloom with the aid of sun-powered irrigation”.  Shuman confidently 
predicted, solar energy would be a main source of power across the globe within decades.19 
 After failing to attract investor interest in the United States, Shuman turned to London, 
the world’s biggest and most global equity market, where his where his colleague and consultant, 
British engineer A.S.E. Ackermann, had contacts in scientific and investment circles. The 
considerable number of British possessions in tropical countries had already stimulated a search 
for alternatives to imported coal or oil. In 1911 Shuman and his partners floated a new company, 
Sun Power Company (Eastern Hemisphere) and persuaded a sufficient number of investors to 
buy its shares to launch a solar energy venture in Egypt.20	
 Shuman was attracted to Egypt both as it had a lot of sun, and because mechanized 
irrigation was ever increasing as the lands adjacent to the Nile River were arable only with 
proper irrigation. Shuman leased land in the farming village of Meadi—which was also the 
administrative center of Egypt —and prepared to have parts for an experimental plant shipped 
from Philadelphia to Egypt.  Shuman project was soon interrupted by the government’s 
engineering consultant to the government who sought costly improvements.21  To save on costs 
Shuman decided to build the plant from scratch in Meadi, using local materials instead of 
building parts in Philadelphia and having them shipped to Egypt. The first commercial scale 
solar plant was successfully launched. The British administration, thrilled at having found a cost-
effective way to upgrade Egypt’s irrigation system and increase the country’s lucrative cotton 
crop, offered Shuman a 30,000- acre cotton plantation in British Sudan on which to build a larger 
version of the solar plant.  Because of the rivalry between Germany, England and France over 
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the Middle East and Africa, the German government took notice of the potential of solar in 
colonies and awarded Shuman $200,000 to design and construct a solar-powered irrigation 
system in East Africa.  This success led the inventor to envision even larger solar power plants, 
including a project of a 20,000 square mile plant in the Sahara desert to generate 270 million 
horsepower—an amount, he noted, equal to all the fuel burned around the world in 1909.22 
 Shuman’s ambitious solar plans were brought to an end by the outbreak of World War 
1.   Engineers working at the Meadi plant, including Shuman, returned to their home countries 
and within several months the plant itself was dismantled for parts and scrap metal. Shuman died 
of a heart attack in 1918.23 After the end of the War, the momentum for further experimentation 
was lost, as the prices of fossil fuels fell sharply during the postwar recession, and then fell again 
after the outbreak of the Great Depression in 1929.24 
 
Solar Homes 
 The first engineered passive solar houses of the modern era were built in Germany after 
World War I, when the Allies occupied the Ruhr area, including most of Germany's coal mines.25 
From the 1930s the American architect George F. Keck experimented with the basic principles 
of passive solar houses.26 He designed the all-glass "House of Tomorrow" for the 1933 Century 
of Progress Exposition in Chicago,27 and noted that it was warm inside on sunny winter days 
prior to the installation of the furnace. Following this, he gradually started incorporating more 
south-facing windows into his designs for his clients. In 1940 he designed a passive solar home 
for real estate developer Howard Sloan in Glenview, Illinois. Named the "solar house" by the 
Chicago Tribune, the Sloan House became first house to carry this name. Sloan continued to 
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build numerous passive solar houses, which contributed to the emergence of a "solar house" 
movement in the 1940s.28 
 During the 1930s researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) also 
experimented with solar home designs that incorporated pumps and storage devices. MIT’s Solar 
1 house was completed in 1939 to demonstrate how the sun could heat houses in the winter, and 
MIT researchers also conducted experiments to judge the possibility of solar-powered air 
conditioning and energy generation. In 1938, Godfrey Lowell Cabot, the Boston industrialist and 
pioneer aviator, gave a gift to MIT to be used specifically for “the art of converting the energy of 
the sun to the use of man.” 29 
 In the United States interest in energy efficiency emerged during the Second World War 
when potential energy shortages became an issue. In addition, technology advances in the glass 
industry allowed homebuilders in cold climates to use larger window area. In 1945, the Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Company, which in the previous decade had been experimenting with double-
glazing windows in order to retain heat, initiated a large scale solar house project after receiving 
numerous letters from prospective home buyers interested in energy efficient houses. The 
company planned to build solar houses in 48 states and selected local architects to design these 
houses, using a jury composed of editors, university deans and other key personalities in the 
building industry.30 The project was launched but encountered harsh criticism. Purdue University 
engineering professor F.W Hutchison, conducted extensive experiments on these constructions 
and concluded that passive solar houses “may be net money losers in terms of heating costs”31, in 
the end, the solar house movement failed to create a community of solar architects or to launch a 
widespread solar house movement after 1947. Instead, with the boost of “all electric houses” 
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architects gained increasing interest in the late 1940s on the possibilities of electric cooling and 
heating.32 
 Passive solar was also employed by a new generation of modernist architects who 
became influential in mid-twentieth century America. Carl Koch was a Cambridge, MA-based 
architect who was educated at Harvard and had studied under Walter Gropius, the Bauhaus 
founder. Koch traveled to Sweden on a fellowship in 1938, and was struck how Swedes had 
begun to prefabricate. He began working on building houses that were significantly cheaper, but 
still fully functional and pleasant homes. Koch's first project, in 1941, upon returning to the 
United States was a community housing project called Snake Hill in Belmont, Massachusetts. 
Koch developed the project as a way to design an inexpensive home for himself and his family, 
who moved into the one of the complex's five original houses built on a rocky hillside, which 
had previously been regarded as uninhabitable.  
 This experience inspired Koch to pursue a career in creating quality affordable housing 
for American families. He believed that the best post-World War-II housing solution for the 
shifting and expanding American population was the creation of demountable, prefabricated 
housing. Koch developed the “Techbuilt House” in 1954, designed with prefabricated 
components that could be custom assembled to create houses that were unique to the needs of the 
client, but could benefit from the affordability of mass production.  Koch designed houses with 
post-and-beam construction that allowed for the large expanses of glazing.  The exterior design 
was characterized by a single gable roof, large plate glass windows on the gable ends, and deep 
eaves. Techbuilt houses often were designed around a common family “hearth,” featured built-in 
prefabricated furniture systems, and celebrated the connection to the outside through large 
expanses of windows and outdoor rooms. Although Koch is not celebrated as a solar pioneer, the 
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large windows made effective use of passive solar heat. Koch was concerned, broadly, with 
sustainability issues. In his book about his architectural work written in 1958, Koch wrote of his 
hopes that in the future “atomic or solar energy” would provide the cheap electricity needed for 
heating and cooling.33  
 Architects continued to experiment with passive solar during the postwar decades. During 
the 1950s Felix Trombe in France built houses where the entire south wall consisted of thick 
masonry with few or no windows. The wall was faced with glass or other material which allowed 
sunlight to pass through to the masonry but inhibited re-radiation of the heat outward. As a result 
the south wall accumulated heat during the day and gave it up gradually to the interior of the 
house at night. The substantial downside was the loss of any view. During the 1970s, as energy 
prices soared, solar hot-water systems made a re-appearance in the United States, with small 
companies selling systems which employed flat-plate collectors on south-facing roofs.34 
The Photovoltaic Cell and the New Solar Industry in the United States 
 The solar industry was re-invented through the development of the photovoltaic cell 
(hereafter PV). PV cells converted solar radiation directly into electricity. When photons of 
sunlight strike the cell, electrons are knocked free from silicon atoms and are drawn off by a grid 
of metal conductors, yielding a flow of direct current. It was, at least potentially, a dream 
technology. An article in Science magazine noted: 
“If there is a dream solar technology it is probably photovoltaics – solar cells…They have no 
moving parts and are consequently quiet, extremely reliable, and easy to operate. Photovoltaic 
cells are a space age electronic marvel, at once the most sophisticated solar technology and the 
simplest, most environmentally benign source of electricity yet conceived.”35 
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The new technology had its origins in the postwar United States. The story began at Bell 
Laboratories, the research facility of AT&T which was famously responsible for inventing 
television, lasers and transistors, and much else.36 Russell Ohl’s invention of the silicon solar 
battery in 1946 was a key breakthrough. Ohl, who had joined Bell Laboratories in 1927, was a 
physicist whose specialized area of research was the behavior of crystals. In 1939 Ohl discovered 
the PN barrier “P–N junction”. There was little known about the impurities within crystals, but 
Ohl discovered the mechanism by which it worked. It was the impurities which made some 
sections more resistant to electrical flow than others, and thus it was the "barrier" between these 
areas of different purity that made the crystal work. Ohl later found that super-purifying 
germanium was the key to making repeatable and usable semiconductor material for diodes. His 
work with diodes led him later to develop the first silicon solar cell, and in 1946 he filed a US 
patent for a “Light sensitive device”. 37 
 In 1954 other Bell Laboratory scientists invented the first PV cell which could produce 
significant electric power. Daryl Chaplin had joined Bell labs in 1930, and in the early 1950s 
began working on finding new sources of power for transistor telephones. This led to 
experiments with converting solar energy into electrical energy. Chaplin, and fellow scientists 
Gerald Pearson and Calvin Fuller, used strips of silicon placed in sunlight to capture free 
electrons and turn them into sunlight. Their public demonstration of the cell  inspired a 1954 
New York Times article to predict that solar cells would eventually lead "to the realization of one 
of mankind's most cherished dreams -- the harnessing of the almost limitless energy of the 
sun.''38The silicon photovoltaic invention by Bell Labs came to the attention of the recently 
created US space program. PV solar cells appeared as potential solution to power those satellites. 
39   
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 The Bell PV solar cell coincided with a renewal of interest in solar energy more 
generally. In 1953 a multi-volume report to the U.S. President by W.S. Paley on “Resources for 
Freedom” had made the case that fossil fuels seemed to be in declining supply. This stimulated 
the formation of an Association for Applied Solar Energy in 1954. In November of the following 
year it organized two conferences, one on the scientific basis of solar energy in Tuscon, followed 
by a World Symposium on Applied Solar Energy in Phoenix. These meetings attracted delegates 
from 37 countries, and Bell’s PV cell was exhibited. The Association energetically pursued new 
prospects for solar energy. In 1957 it held an International Architectural Solar House 
Competition which attracted more than 1,000 architects from 36 countries. The winning design 
was never built.40 
The commercialization of the production of PV cells turned out to be very complex, and 
was led by small entrepreneurial firms. A pioneer was Hoffman Electronics, founded in Los 
Angeles by Leslie Hoffman in 1946. He started manufacturing small tube radios, and in 1948 
moved into televisions. During the 1950s the firm began manufacturing semiconductors. In 
1956, the company acquired National Fabricated Products, which owned the original patent 
license of the PV Bell Labs technology. Hoffman’s solar cells were used in satellites, beginning 
with the first Vanguard I, in 1958. This satellite used a small, less than one watt, solar array to 
power its radios. Hoffman worked steadily to increase the efficiency of solar cells. In 1958 it 
created an 8% efficient solar cell. Within two years it had a 14% efficient solar cell.41 
	 A second entrepreneurial venture in solar cells was created by Alfred Mann. After 
growing up poor in Portland, Oregon, and selling lemonade and magazines during the Great 
Depression, he studied physics at UCLA during the late 1940s. His interest in studying light led 
15	
	
to a first job with Technicolor, a Los Angeles firm whose color film processes dominated the 
Hollywood film industry. The Army approached Technicolor for help with light filtering for a 
missile guidance system but, when Technicolor did not want the work, Mann pursued the 
$11,200 Army contract by leaving the company and forming a small company called Spectrolab 
in 1956. Two years later Mann was approached by someone from the Air Force who said they 
wanted to build a spacecraft powered with solar cells, but there was a problem that solar cells 
lost efficiency when they got hot. As Mann later recalled,   
“I thought about it and decided that maybe we could apply a coating to the solar cells that would 
make them run cooler and be more efficient in space. They gave me a purchase order to make 
some samples. The samples worked well and they gave us a contract for the first spacecraft. 
They liked our workmanship and our competence. Later they wanted us to assemble the solar 
panels. We really didn’t want to do that, but the company that was assembling them was not 
doing well, so we thought about it long and hard. ... We got the contract and as it turns out we 
were very profitable.” 42 
 Mann placed the production of solar cells in another company he had founded, Heliotech, 
which made semiconductors. In 1960 Mann sold Spectrolab and Heliotech subsidiaries to the 
fast-growing conglomerate Textron, which was building a presence in military procurement. In 
the same year it acquired Bell Aircraft, which had helped design the first aircraft to surpass the 
speed of sound. Bell also built many of the X-1’s successors. Hoffmann Electronics continued in 
the solar cell business, and within a year was suing Textron for hiring away its engineers to learn 
trade secrets.43 
 The prospect of government contracts encouraged other large electronics companies to 
experiment with the solar market. These included the radio and television manufacturer RCA, 
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and the semiconductor companies such as Texas Instruments. Universities and research institutes 
invested in solar, on a modest scale. The solar market in the United States, however, remained 
small. The primary market was powering satellites, so NASA provided the major market. In 
1964 NASA launched the first Nimbus satellite powered by a 470-watt PV array. During the 
1960s and 1970s the annual market of solar cells was worth about $5 to $10 million for a 50 to 
100 KW of capacity. 44 (See Appendix Table 2)  
This market was tiny in the context of the overall energy market. The low and often 
falling costs of fossil fuels meant that it rarely made financial sense to invest in solar technology, 
except for a specialized purpose such as space exploration. Moreover, during the postwar 
decades nuclear fission was wildly seen as offering the potential of unlimited and cheap energy. 
This was, as one contemporary wrote, “a dominant factor in casting a vote against the need for 
looking at any other energy options.”45 There was a further issue also. Although solar industry 
was classified as “renewable”, the manufacture of PV cells was not without adverse 
consequences for the environment. PV manufacture used many of the same chemicals as heavy 
metals used in semiconductor manufacture.  In particular, there was the issue of the length of 
time which cells needed to operate to produce as much energy as was used to manufacture 
them.46 
Solar and the Oil Crisis of the 1970s 
The oil price rises of 1973-4 and 1978-9 ended for the moment the era of cheap oil which 
had characterized the postwar decades, while raising major concerns about the security of oil 
supplies. This encouraged governments everywhere to reconsider energy supplies and 
consumption, but with policy variations between countries. France and Sweden, for example, 
launched a major nuclear energy program.47  
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In some countries, alternative energy sources like wind and solar were looked at with 
new interest, especially because of growing environment concerns. In 1972 the United Nations 
held its first Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. This launched an 
Environment Program. Although little concrete emerged from this, the potential of solar energy 
became more widely discussed than previously. One report in 1977, for example, lauded the 
potential of solar energy for the Mediterranean region. This energy resource, the report observed, 
was renewable, “clean” and well-distributed. “Solar energy”, it continued, “is the only possible 
solution for countries which are poor in fossil energy but which do not wish to be totally 
dependent either on oil or on the atom for their supplies.”48  
The United States had both oil and nuclear energy, but the oil crises also raised new 
interest in alternative energy. Peter Glaser, a Vice President of Arthur D. Little, the Cambridge, 
Massachusetts firm of management consultants, was an enthusiast for solar energy even before 
the oil crises.49 After 1973 the firm was engaged in multiple projects related to solar energy. It 
had contracts from NASA to explore solar power applications to satellites. In that year launched 
a project under a contract from the Electric Power Research Institute to explore the prospects of 
developing a “solar climate control industry”, which would involve developing solar-powered 
systems for heat storage, air conditioning and other equipment. The project was pursued with 
considerable investment through to 1980.50 Glaser also used the firm’s knowledge of satellite 
technology to pursue a project on how solar energy in space could be captured and employed to 
generate electricity on earth.51 
 In 1974 the Ford Foundation produced a major report entitled “A Time to Choose: 
America’s Energy Future.” The report took a nuanced short and long-term view of energy 
supplies from all sources, including the prospects for making fossil fuels such as coal much 
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cleaner than at present. A striking feature of the report was its clear identification of issues which 
would continue to be discussed for the next four decades. The report talked in detail about the 
greenhouse effect, and the several indications that man’s use of fossil fuels is altering the global 
climate.” The report dealt in detail with the importance and potential of nuclear energy in solving 
long-term energy needs, before drawing attention to both “the risks of nuclear power” and the 
lack of sustainable solutions to waste storage.52 Solar energy did not feature prominently in the 
report, but it did feature as the “world’s most abundant renewable energy resource.” The authors 
were especially impressed with the prospects for solar heating and cooling in buildings, and 
asserted that the technologies for more fundamental use of solar in the generation of electricity 
were on the threshold of taking off – if the government would provide as much seed money as it 
had earlier for nuclear energy.53  
 This level of support for solar, however, was not forthcoming. However, the Federal 
government did re-organize its energy bureaucracy, creating the Energy Research and 
Development Administration. Nuclear and coal were still seen as the main sources of electricity, 
though wind and solar now received some attention.54 The most significant government initiative 
was the Solar Energy Research Development and Demonstration Act of 1974. Originally called 
the Solar Energy Research Institute, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) began 
operating in Golden, Colorado in July 1977. However funding for solar remained modest. The 
greater problem was, as in the case of wind energy, a government mindset focused on defense 
and space contracting, which led to a preference for big and expensive projects.55 During 
Congressional hearings in 1978, Jim Harding of Friends of the Earth, and the co-author of a large 
study about the benefits of solar energy, unfavorably compared US spending with the advances 
in solar-heated home technology seen in Germany, Denmark and Canada. Harding noted the 
19	
	
program was “ill-funded”, but also that “much of the money has been misused…our U.S. solar 
program is an international embarrassment. It is an embarrassment because it stresses overbuilt, 
over –designed, far too expensive technologies that will never be solutions.”56 
 These Congressional hearings were noteworthy for their identification of the problems 
which would beset US government policy for decades. A representative of the Worldwatch 
Institute told the Committee that “there is no substitute for money. While competing energy 
sources have financially benefitted from the diligent efforts of scores of highly-paid lobbyists, 
solar energy has not”.57 A consulting engineer on the faculty of the School of Architecture at the 
University of Southern California, noted that the growth of the US had 
“been based on cheap energy..we have done everything we can to make it easy to build cheaply, 
and inefficiently and then to subsidize it by operating with cheap energy…These same policies 
prevent us from going into more energy efficient scenarios, as for example, solar technology. We 
are always asked, why don’t we go solar, and then, what kind of a payoff is there.”58 
 In the same year a set of public policies aimed at stimulating demand for alternative 
energy proved important for both the solar and wind energy businesses in the United States. The 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 opened the door to competition in the 
electricity supply by requiring utility companies to buy electricity from “qualifying facilities” 
also known as “nonutility facilities that produce electric power”  including renewable power 
plants. The 1978 Energy Tax Act also offered a 30-percent investment tax credit for residential 
consumers for solar and wind energy equipment and a 10-percent investment tax credit for 
business consumers for the installation of solar, wind, and geothermal, technologies. The utility 
commissioners of individual states were left to implement the rules.59 
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The state of California under Governor Jerry Brown took the most radical measures to 
promote alternative energy. In 1978 Brown established a SolarCal office to co-ordinate solar 
energy programs within the state with the state architect, Sim van der Ryn, who was in charge of 
a $200 million solar and conservationist program. Van der Ryn was particularly concerned to 
build energy efficient public buildings, and installed solar energy in them. As he remembered 
much later, 
“At that time we needed more office space, because Reagan has taken all the space in the 
suburbs for his friends, you know… republican contractors and real-estate speculators. At that 
time the state wasn’t broke, and we figured, it would be cheaper on the long run to build our own 
buildings (public offices) instead of leasing them. Those buildings needed to be energy 
efficient…I remember going to the legislature and walking in with a one gallon gas tank and I 
told them, ‘it takes a gallon of oil to heat and cool a square foot of this state office by the time 
I’m done here, I’ll reduce it to a tea cup.’ They thought it was a little crazy, but the graphic 
example intrigued them, and literally we were able to do that.”60  
The Californian state, more generally, also offered a 55 per cent credit against State 
income tax credit for people who bought solar energy systems. This credit was given both to 
consumers and to house builders in order to encourage the use of multiple solar designs in 
houses. The program was designed to expand the market sufficiently to capture scale economies 
and eventually lower prices.”61  
 Federal support for solar rose to a new height under the administration of President 
Carter. Carter had entered office concerned about energy consumption and supply – in April 
1977 he had labeled the energy problem “the moral equivalent of war,” but had not been 
especially concerned about alternative energy sources. However the Iranian Revolution and the 
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second oil shock in 1979 resulted in a swathe of measures designed to stimulate domestic 
production, develop synthetic fossil fuels, constrain oil consumption, and develop wind and solar 
power.62 In 1979 the administration announced a new $3 billion program of research into solar 
industry, which included installing a showcase solar heater at the White House.63 By the early 
1980s the US represented 80 per cent of the world market for solar energy. US-based companies 
accounted for 85 per cent of world sales.64 The United States exported 45 per cent of its 
production and dominated world markets.65 
 
Searching for Scale 
 The rise of Federal and state government investment in solar energy prompted the entry 
of new entrepreneurial actors in the United States interested in transitioning the industry from the 
space program to new markets on earth. This turned out to be an expensive proposition, both in 
terms of capital and in terms of the time taken to develop technologies. Much earlier than in 
wind energy, entrepreneurs in solar found themselves turning to big corporations. The results 
were mixed. 
 In the United States, oil companies emerged as key investors. There were multiple 
motivations, but initially one stood out: solar was a potential solution to a specific operational 
problem of powering offshore platforms. By 1980, solar powered navigation systems were 
installed in all production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. At that date, oil companies accounted 
for 70 per cent of all the solar modules sold in the United States.66 Table 1 lists the major US oil 
company investments in solar during these decades. 
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Table 1 Major U.S. Oil Company Investments in Solar Energy 1970-1980 
 
Date Firm Strategy  Outcome 
1973 Exxon Creates Solar Power Sold to Solarex in 
1984 
1974 Mobil Joint Venture with 
Tyco 
Sold to ASE 1994 
1977 Arco Acquires Solar Power Sold to Siemens 1990 
1979 Amoco Invests in Solarex  
(100% in1983) 
Amoco acquired by 
BP 1999 
 
 These large investments from oil companies began with the activities of Elliot Berman, a 
New Jersey-based industrial chemist. In 1972 Berman developed a new, cheaper type of solar 
cell based on organic materials such as dyes. During the 1960s Berman had worked for the Itek 
Corporation, a US defense contractor which made cameras for spy satellites. Itek was, like many 
companies at the time, concerned to diversify its business, and Berman successfully facilitated 
their entry into the photographic materials business. In 1968 the firm invited Berman to consider 
new businesses, and he determined that he wanted to develop products which had a major social 
impact. He identified a correlation between “energy availability and quality of life,” and began to 
consider ways to provide electrical power for the rural poor in developing countries. He found 
the solution in the promise of solar energy. In view of the high cost of silicon cells, he suggested 
that the company needed to invest in a new type of solar cell, made from the photographic film 
on which he had worked. Itek did not proceed with the project.67 
 Berman left his company, and spent six months attempting to interest venture capitalists 
and others in his proposed solar project. After eighteenth months a chance conversation led 
Berman to Exxon, which had just begun to consider looking at alternative energies in the 
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expectation that conventional energy prices would raise substantially over the following decades. 
Berman moved his lab into the oil company, and started developing this new technology. The 
organic cells he was proposing would take years to develop, in the meantime, he decided to buy 
conventional silicon solar cells with which he commercialized an interim product.68 Berman first 
tried to purchase these cells from a small company named Centralab, but all the company had to 
sell were rejects from the space program which was far from enough to meet his needs. He then 
decided to fly to Japan, to meet with the Japanese company Sharp, which had been producing 
solar cells for over a decade. Berman and Sharp could not agree on a price, and no agreement 
was reached.69 
 Berman realized he needed to manufacture these silicon solar cells himself. In April 
1973, he launched Solar Power Corporation, a fully owned subsidiary of Exxon. This was the 
first company established to specifically manufacture terrestrial PV cells in the U.S. Berman did 
not use the expensive pure semiconductor-grade crystalline silicon employed in the space 
industry, but instead cheaper silicon wafers rejected by the semiconductor industry. First 
introduced to supply power to remote locations (telecommunications, coast guard etc), it was 
intended in the long run compete with conventional power sources.70 
 Berman initially believed that the US Coast Guard would be the initial primary customer. 
However the Coast Guard, noting the diversity of geographical conditions it faced, declined to 
commit.71 Instead, Berman started manufacturing solar cells to be used on Exxon’s off-shore 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico. According to Berman “We went and visited some Exxon 
platform in the gulf. What we learned, which everybody down there knew, but nobody at the 
headquarters knew, is you have one platform that’s loaded with power, and that’s where all the 
crews live. However, most of the platforms are unmanned and have no power.”72 At the time, the 
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system for powering platforms relied on large lead-acid batteries, each weighting several 
hundred pounds and costing over $2,100 each. When exhausted the crew would simply dispose 
of the batteries in the waters, which had a devastating effect on marine life. In 1978, the 
Environmental Protection Agency outlawed such disposing of batteries in the ocean, which 
added a sense of urgency for oil companies to come up with a new way to power their 
platforms.73 
 A second large US oil company to invest in solar was Mobil. As in the case of Exxon, the 
origins of their involvement lay in an entrepreneur outside the company. During the 1960s a 
researcher called Abraham Mlavsky, working with an investment and holding company called 
Tyco in Waltham, Massachusetts, engaged in semiconductors and energy conversion, developed 
the process for producing a continuous thin ribbon of silicon that could be separated into suitable 
lengths, processed into solar cells, and placed in modules. Tyco had developed the technology 
for growing sapphire tubes for sodium vapor lamps and other products but silicon was a much 
more difficult material to work with, as temperatures had to be extremely tightly controlled for 
the silicon to grow continuously. In 1971 NASA, in search of lighter weight solar cells, gave the 
firm the chance to produce solar cells from ribbon silicon, but were unable to achieve suitable 
conversion efficiencies. NASA resumed interest two years later, and in 1974 Mobil and Tyco 
joined forces to begin developing advanced silicon solar cells. Mobil-Tyco spent years 
attempting to develop efficient production, but by the end of the 1980s they had cut the cost of 
fabricating crystalline silicon solar cells in half. During the early 1990s a plan was developed to 
make and sell solar cells to utilities in the desert regions of the western United States to help 
power residential air-conditioning, but a sharp fall in natural gas prices led to Mobil to divest 
altogether by selling to the German company ASE.74 
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 The entry of Arco, a third US oil company, into solar came through the activities of 
Joseph Lindmeyer and Peter Varadi. Both were working on space solar cells in the early 1970s 
for a satellite company called the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). While at 
COMSAT, Lindmeyer developed a photovoltaic cell that was 50 per cent more efficient than any 
other at the time. COMSAT patented and used this technology on all of its space satellites. 
Lindmeyer did not benefit financially from his invention as he was a salaried employee, and as a 
consequence he went on to design a new production process that he hoped would cut down the 
cost of producing photovoltaic cells dramatically, thus making them possible for terrestrial use, 
but COMSAT was not interested. 75 
             In 1973 Lindmeyer and Varadi decided to leave COMSAT to set up their own company 
to develop terrestrial cells. In February, Solarex was founded. Varadi took on the task of raising 
funds. In 1972, attempts to obtain funding from venture capitalists were not successful, as they 
remained wary of photovoltaics and did not trust two scientists to manage a business. But they 
eventually were able to raise $250,000 from friends and family. Manufacturing began in August. 
Within eight months, Solarex became profitable. Vardi later recalled,  
“Two months after we launched our company the oil crisis happened, in 1973, at that point we 
got a lot of publicity from the media, and soon enough, instead of us having to find people, 
people were coming to us from across the country. Also it was very innovative at the time, we 
were not selling refrigerators so it triggered people’s interest, and people who needed this 
technology knew where they could get it.”76  
 Solarex’s fast growth was placed in jeopardy when COMSAT sued it for patent 
infringement in 1974 but the case was promptly dropped. Solarex sales during the first years 
were concentrated in niche markets, such as powering watches and calculators. Solarex was the 
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first US company to collaborate with Japanese companies to make solar calculators and 
produced remote-area power supplies for radio repeaters. However these orders were small and 
not consistent.77 
 Solarex’s big breakthrough came in 1979 when it obtained equity funding from two 
European companies. Holec, a Dutch electrical company, and Leroy-Somer, a French electric 
power generating company, invested to obtain Solarex’s expertise and license in manufacturing 
photovoltaic cells in order for them to exploit the European markets, but the most significant 
investment for Solarex was a $7m investment from Amoco. With an apparently booming 
photovoltaics market due to supportive government policies, Solarex spent $7m on a new 
“breeder” plant powered by PV cells to produce PV cells. To show its support, Amoco installed 
Solarex photovoltaic panels on one of the service stations located at its head office in Chicago.78 
In 1978, Lindmeyer described the events of the previous four years to the House Sub-Committee 
on Solar Energy: 
“Terrestrial photovoltaics on any industrial scale is only four years old. We have in this short 
period changed the outlook on photovoltaic in a dramatic manner, For more than a decade the 
prices were controlled by the market of the space program which is characteristically small in 
volume and high in price. Space solar panels are typically around $500/watt, which is so high 
that terrestrial use is out of the question. Some four years later we are building a system for a 
community college in Arkansas which will deliver power at some $6/W. We surely feel that 
tremendous progress was made in the last few years.”79 In 1980 an article in the New York Times, 
on the subject of innovation in America, singled out three companies as exemplars of innovation, 
Solarex was one of them, alongside Apple and Genentech.80 
 This optimism soon faded. During the early 1980s the combination of a declining oil price 
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and the withdrawal of Federal government support resulted in Solex experiencing difficulties as 
the solar market stalled. In 1983 Maryland Bank, with which Solarex had a $7m debt, demanded 
full repayment within three months after becoming alarmed by a reporting mistake by the 
Solarex CFO. Solarex could not repay the money or refinance. Efforts to find new investors 
proved fruitless. Amoco acquired full control of Solarex, which joined Solar Power as an oil 
company-owned venture. 
 Acquisition by an oil company was also the fate of another entrepreneurial start-up by a 
former employee of Spectrolab. Bill Yerkes founded Solar Technology International in 1975. 
Yerkes, a mechanical engineering graduate of Stanford, worked for Chrysler and Boeing, where 
he built the Boeing Kent Space Environment Laboratory in support of the Apollo lunar landings. 
After moving to Los Angeles, Yerkes became CEO of Spectrolab, where he was responsible for 
developing the solar technology which was left behind on the moon by Apollo 11, along with 
space batteries. During his time at Spectrolab, Yerkes and his wife had opted to live an 
alternative, environmentally friendly, lifestyle, for nearly two years in a 24-foot house trailer in 
which all appliances, including an electric composting toilet, were powered solely by PV cells, 
despite the presence of adjacent power lines.81  
 Yerkes was sacked when Hughes Aircraft acquired Spectrolab in 1975. He was furious, 
and resolved to build his own solar company. With $80,000 of his own money as seed capital, he 
founded Solar Technology International in a 4,000-square-foot facility in Chatsworth, New 
Jersey, and set about trying to reduce the cost of terrestrial solar cells and modules.  By getting 
rid of silicon as the top cover, and replacing it by tempered glass, a more resistant and easily 
available material, he solved serious maintenance problems. He also restructured cell production 
method by screen-printing contacts onto the cells. The materials and methods he introduced in 
28	
	
the late 1970s became standard for the industry and took costs down.82 
 In 1976, STI got its first significant order from a motor home company which Yerkes 
convinced to install small panels on its motor homes to keep batteries charged during storage. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) - a Federally funded research and development center and 
NASA field center located in the San Gabriel Valley area of Los Angeles County, California -
placed an important order under a US Department of Energy purchase program. STI’s panels 
passed JPL’s rigorous testing program, this helped STI to gain the trust of customers and sales 
picked up subsequently. Yerkes brought in more investors to obtain capital for more advanced 
manufacturing equipment.83 Although Yerkes delivered significant innovations, raising further 
capital proved problematic. In mid-1977, Yerkes sold his company to Atlantic Richfield Oil 
Company (ARCO), another large US oil company, forming ARCO Solar.84  
 ARCO’s investment in solar reflected the firm’s longstanding commitment to 
environment issues. Robert O Anderson, the founder of the firm in the 1940s, was an outspoken 
proponent of the responsibility of business to solve the world’s environmental problems. He was 
among the supporters of the foundation of Friends of the Earth, and a regular speaker at 
international events on the need to protect the environment, and was actively involved in the 
preparations for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 
1972.  As early as 1969 ARCO itself had appointed a prominent ecologist to work in Alaska as 
its chief ecologist and environmental advisor, and by the 1970s the firm was highly committed to 
minimizing environmental pollution from its operations. It responded quickly to the Federal 
Clean Air Act of 1970 with a low-octane, lead-free gasoline.85 
During the next decade ARCO invested over $200 million in its new venture, of which 
Yerkes estimated 90 per cent was defrayed by tax credits.86  Yerkes remained as vice president 
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of engineering and technology, and scaled up by creating a research laboratory of 100 people in a 
new 10,000 square feet production facility. However Yerkes quickly encountered the downsides 
of working with a large oil company. They imported managers who had no understanding of 
solar technology, and pursued technological options in thin-film silicon which he considered 
unviable. Going into commercial production in 1980, ARCO built the first production facility of 
greater than 1 MW capacity. ARCO was involved in several high profile PV projects including 
utility-scale plants, all in California. In 1982 in built the first privately funded central-station PV 
plant on the high desert near Hesperia in that state. The plant, which was unmanned, fed 
electricity into the distribution grid of the Southern California Edison utility.87 Internationally, 
ARCO developed partners and sold PVs for off-grid applications into over 80 countries.88  
ARCO became, for a time, the largest PV manufacturer in the world, and engaged 
heavily in research, forming a strategy which Anderson described as “growing tomorrow’s new 
industries.”89 The firm’s sales reached $40 million in 1988. Yerkes however left the firm in 
1985, returning to Boeing. Five years later ARCO sold the solar business, which never generated 
profits, to Siemens, for an estimated $30-$50 million.90 
  The entry of the oil companies into the solar industry had a number of downsides, 
especially making it difficult for other entrepreneurial ventures to compete with their now well-
funded peers. This was evident in the case of Ishaq Shahryar, another solar visionary. Shahryar 
had arrived in the United States in 1956 on a scholarship from the government in Afghanistan. 
He enrolled at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and studied chemistry. On graduation 
he worked in the semiconductor industry, before joining Spectrolab. With the help of two other 
scientists, he invented low-cost PV cells and developed the process of screen-printing cells on 
solar panels, which is still used in the market today. Shahryar had vivid memories of his youth in 
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Afghanistan, where he had had to study by candle or kerosene light when the electricity supplies 
went off. He told Yerkes that while the United States might have plentiful electricity, there was a 
huge potential market in the Middle East and Asia for solar energy. Shahryar had an explicit 
social agenda- “My goal was rural electrification- a light for students to read by at night”.91 
When Hughes Aircraft bought Spectrolab in 1975 and refocused on space, Shahryar resolved to 
found his own company, Solec International, Inc. “My motivation”, he later wrote, “was what 
service I could do for other people.” He sold his car, raised $200,000 in investment capital, and 
secured a $500,000 loan from the Small Business Administration to start a business.92 
 As was a common experience in the solar industry, Solec experienced considerable 
difficulty building a viable business. It was able to sell to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and also 
benefitted from the Carter stimulus program. In 1981 Shahryar sold 80 per cent of the company 
to the Pilkington Glass Company in Britain, but after five unprofitable years, the British 
company sold their holding back to Shahryar. There followed a difficult period, in which the 
company faced the risk of bankruptcy. In 1987 Solec provided the solar cells for a solar electric 
race car being built by the hair care entrepreneur and multi-millionaire John Paul DeJoria, an 
active supporter of environmental issues, who promptly invested $1 million in the struggling 
venture.93 
Shahryar’s strategy rested on avoiding direct competition with the oil company financed 
ventures by focusing on niche markets, such as solar panel systems for lighting bus shelters and 
streets. He concentrated on improving single-crystal silicons rather than more expensive, thin-
film, technologies. By the mid-1990s Shahryar had a modest 2 per cent of the US PV market, 
and it was profitable, but he still needed funds to build scale.	 
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 The Middle East also had a role to play in one of the largest solar businesses of this era. 
LUZ International was the brainchild of Arnold Goldman, a Rhode Island-born engineering 
graduate of the University of Southern California.  After graduating in 1967, he went to work for 
the military engineering contractor Litton Industries, and then founded his own company to 
develop word processing on personal computers. He sold his shares in 1977, becoming wealthy, 
and moved to Israel to write a book of philosophy and social theory which he started almost two 
decades earlier.  Goldman envisaged the creation of a utopian city, which he named LUZ after 
the Biblical city where Jacob dreamed of a ladder ascending to heaven, which would consist of 
twelve component communities surrounded by a wall which would gather sunlight to prove 
energy. He advocated a new type of intellectualism he called biocosmology, which would allow 
humans to “clearly see the relationship between the whole and the particulars of daily life”.94   
 Although the concept of building solar cities got little traction, there was interest and 
government funding for solar energy in the wake of the second oil crisis and growing fear that 
Middle Eastern oil supplies might be cut off from Israel. Goldman formed LUZ International in 
partnership with an entrepreneur called Patrick François, a French-Israeli dual national. They 
drafted a business plan and traveled to the U.S. looking for venture capitalists to invest in their 
project. Goldman and François decided to base LUZ’s R&D and manufacturing in Israel. 
However there was little interest in investing in solar, and even less in investing in a foreign 
company. Goldman then went back to the investors who had supported his earlier, word 
processing company, and appealed directly to the Jewish community. With funding, Goldman 
built a small solar energy collecting with a computer control system to keep it aimed at the sun, 
which produced steam and heat. A small industrial process-steam generator was built for a 
kibbutz in Israel. When this worked, LUZ started building three pilot industrial steam systems 
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for textile companies in the southeastern United States. It turned out that this plan was not viable. 
The locations with the best sunlight, like Californian deserts, had no industrial facilities which 
needed steam, whilst the areas with factories often had less sunlight.95 
 PURPA, or rather the state of California’s energetic execution of it, salvaged the 
business. After learning that a subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum, which was also in the process 
steam market, obtained a contract from a utility, the Southern Californian Edison Company, to 
sell it power, Goldman decided to refocus on that market. Between 1984 and 1990 LUZ raised a 
$1 billion and built nine reflective solar collectors in the Mojave desert, which focused sunlight 
on oil-carrying receiver pipes. The oil was heated as it circulated through the pipe to create the 
steam for turbine generator. LUZ sold its electricity using the feed-in tariffs, and earning returns 
for its investors through careful use of tax credits.96 
 Other types of solar business also developed in California. David Katz was an electrical 
engineer who worked for the Navy for a few years as a civilian technician before joining the 
“back the land” trend and moving to a community in northern California near San Francisco. His 
house was off the grid, and to generate electricity he experimented with putting extra batteries in 
his car which could be charged as he drove. By accident, he encountered solar energy. As he 
later recalled, 
“I was at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas in 1980, and there was a guy selling solar 
toys. He had one solar panel in the booth. I bought 100 and went back to northern California and 
sold them all in a couple of days. Now you didn't have to have your car. For a couple thousand 
dollars, you	could	have	lights	and	music	in	your	house.”97 
He founded Alternative Energy Engineering to sell solar devices to people who lived beyond the 
electric grid. By the mid-1990s, the company published a hundred-page catalogue and built new 
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headquarters made of recycled redwood and steel. The company claimed to stock the largest 
variety of equipment for making and efficiently using electricity anywhere and shipped its 
product around the world.98  
 Other young entrepreneurs, attracted by the alternative lifestyle, also invested in solar. 
Wayne Robertson was one of them, a licensed lumberer, and a son of two police officers in Los 
Angeles, was eager to escape the city life and bought a piece of property with his wife in a 
secluded area in Northern California. That’s when he gained interest in solar. As he later 
recalled, “I was living about 12 miles off the grids, so we used to plug our vehicles in different 
things to create power and to run our homes. So solar was just a natural progression, a natural 
thing to happen, and you know most of the people living in these hills were highly educated folks 
who didn’t want to use fossil fuels, they were looking for an alternative source of power, so this 
is really what got us started.”99  
Robertson after experimenting for years in his backyard with solar panels, he launched 
with the financial backing of a friend Solar Electric Specialties (SES) in 1981, retailing solar 
panels (manufactured by ARCO and Solarex) to off-grid costumers with alternative lifestyle. 
Within a couple of years SES controlled most of the U.S. western market selling almost 
exclusively to alternative lifestyle costumers “I started thinking about a smart way we could use 
and sell these PV panels, and where I lived, there was a lot of people who living off the grid and 
with a similar mindset as us (…) there were also marijuana growers living around that had lots of 
money and were willing to try new things (…) those were our first clients”.100 
By the end of the 1980s the financial record of the US solar industry was decidedly 
mixed. In California, small niche businesses like those of Solec, and Katz and Roberston, were 
profitable. Luz has also made successful use of tax concessions and PURPA. The large 
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investments by oil companies had created substantial enterprises. In 1993 Amoco-owned Solarex 
and Siemens Solar (the formerly Arco-owned Solar) were the dominant forces in the US PV 
industry, accounting for 84 per cent of US shipments and 31 per cent of the world shipments.101 
They had not, however, turned solar energy into a profitable business, certainly compared to the 
profits that could be earned in the petroleum industry, though they had made life difficult for 
smaller firms trying to build solar energy businesses. 
US companies had led the commercialization of PV technologies. The technology had 
emerged from Bell Laboratory, the postwar American powerhouse of innovation. It had been 
developed by semiconductor manufacturers, another industry in which the Federal government 
had taken a lead. These and other firms invested initially primarily because of government 
demand for PVs for the space program. Government demand was expanded through the 
programs to stimulate renewable energy from the 1970s, both at the Federal level and in states 
such as California. This attracted new entrepreneurs into the industry. As the costs of further 
technological development rose, a further set of deep-pocked American firms bought up 
entrepreneurial firms and took the technology to the next level. However deep pockets proved no 
solution to make the technology profitable. 
 
Collapse and Renewal of the US Industry 
 As in the case of wind energy, solar energy was always vulnerable to shifts in the price of 
alternative fuels, and to often related changing public policies. During the 1980s both factors 
eroded the conditions which had favored the spread of solar in the previous decade. The world 
price of oil, which had peaked in 1980 at over US$35 per barrel, fell to $10 per barrel by 1986. 
The price of oil and natural gas, remained far below previous heights for the following two 
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decades. This coincided with ideological shifts in the United States which resulted in reduced 
support for renewable energy.  
 The election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 brought the Carter solar program to 
an abrupt end. During fiscal year 1981 the Reagan Administration cut solar funding by $79 
million and reduced the solar energy budget to about $193 million for fiscal year 1982, in favor 
of nuclear. Reagan rejected recommendations of the Solar Energy Research Institute suggesting 
that the United States could implement a program to increase the share of renewables in energy 
production. The staff of SERI was cut from 950 to 350.102 The vocal support for solar of 
environmentalists and anti-nuclear activists, like the actress Jane Fonda, was a liability in the 
new political context, as solar was in effect politicized within the American political system.103 
Solar tax credits initially escaped the budget axe. These credits include a 40 per cent residential 
credit for homeowners on the first $10,000 invested in solar equipment and conversion, a 15 per 
cent residential credit for landlords, a 15 per cent business investment credit, and a tax credit for 
industrial development bonds for state renewable resource programs. In 1985 most of these 
credits were ended apart from the business solar investment credit which continued until 1988.104 
Meanwhile, the Republican governors who succeeded Jerry Brown in the state of California after 
1982 also began to close down credits and subsidies.105 
. The changing price of oil, and shifts in public policies, resulted in divestments and 
closures. This risk was understood by entrepreneurs at the time. Varadi later commented on his 
own policy towards Solarex, 
“We never relied on government money or programs, we were constantly going after costumers, 
where the real money is. For example Solar Power Corp, who was our main competitor when we 
started, had to shut down because they were depending on federal funding and the government 
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was also their main costumer. We made it a point to not work exclusively with government 
agencies at Solarex.”106 
 Among those affected by the sudden downturn in the solar market was Stanford V. 
Ovshinsky. He had invented an automated lathe in the 1940s, and launched into a career in 
inventing focused on the use of amorphous materials, which include combinations of cesium, 
tellurium, germanium and other elements. He and his wife set up a company called Energy 
Conversion Devices in 1960. During the following decade Ovshinsky became interested in PVs, 
and began working with cheaper materials than the expensive silicon crystals used at the time. In 
1977, his work with these materials led him to begin work on a machine that would make a 
paper-thin film of PV. The Ovshinsky’s planned a factory that would make such thin-film solar 
PV. Ovshinsky envisioned a machine that would deposit layers of the electricity-producing film 
on flexible materials, such as stainless steel, plastic membranes and even shingles. He struggled 
to interest investors, but in 1980 Atlantic Richfield invested $25 million in a three year contract. 
In the context of the Reagan cuts to solar budgets, this contract was not renewed. As funding 
sources dried up in the United States, Overshinsky went offshore. He formed a joint venture with 
the Japanese electronics company Sharp, in which Standard Oil of Ohio also took a 5 per cent 
share. A plant was opened in Japan.107 
Solar companies in the United States became pawns in the market for corporate control, 
as one owner who had failed to make the business profitable sold it on to another. Increasingly, 
as in the case of Overshinsky, entrepreneurs looked abroad. In 1984 Exxon sold the Solar Power 
Corp. to Amoco-owned Solarex. Arco sold its solar business to Siemens in 1990, by which time 
it was largest PV manufacturer in the world. Andersen had retired from Arco by this time, and 
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his successors justified the sale on the grounds that they had invested $200 million in solar 
energy but it was still not profitable.108 Five years later Siemens sold the business to Shell. Mobil 
also sold its solar business to German-owned ASE in 1994.109 In 1994 Shahryar sold control of 
Solec to two Japanese firms, Sanyo and the Sumitomo Corporation, originally staying with the 
company, and then in 1996 founding a new company, the Solar Utility Company in Los Angeles. 
In 2002, Shahryar sold his company in order to volunteer as the Afghan ambassador to the 
United States. He was the first Afghan ambassador in 23 years for the United States, representing 
the government of Hamid Karzai for one year. 110 
 The changing environment also resulted in the end of LUZ. The company had 
uniquely, for a solar company, survived during the Reagan decade. By 1990 it had built and 
installed nine solar power stations in California. For the tenth project it hoped that investors from 
previous projects would continue as before. However, LUZ had previously been exempt from 
Californian property tax, and this exemption suddenly stopped. It was a fatal development. In the 
words of Goldman , 
“Solar and other renewable energy plants require working in a zero, or at least very low, 
property-tax environment in order to be economic. Solar - or wind - energy is basically a fuel 
substitute. Like fuel, what solar thermal does is heat up water to make steam, which makes 
electricity. Unlike fuel, such as coal or gas or fossil - which when burned goes into the air, and 
therefore does not require property tax - solar energy requires a huge amount of solar-energy 
heat-producing equipment. In fact, large solar plants can have billions of dollars' worth of solar 
equipment. Equipment is considered "assets." And assets - unless expressly exempt - require 
property tax. Still, we decided to try to build the 10th project, because approximately 90 per cent 
of the California State Assembly favored extending the property tax exemption. But, in his last 
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few minutes in office, governor George Deukmejian vetoed the legislation, and this made it 
impossible for us to finance the 10th project. ….it was absolutely ridiculous. 111 
 LUZ International filed for bankruptcy in 1991.  
 
Japan and Europe  
During the postwar decades both Japan and Europe lacked both the huge space program 
and the governmental investment in renewables during the 1970s which had driven the growth of 
the American PV industry. As a result the investment in the industry relied less on the prospect 
of government contracts, and more on the potential of solar for commercial use. In both regions, 
the development of PV technology was led by electronics firms. As the American solar industry 
spluttered, a powerful new source of growth appeared, especially in Japan and Germany, as 
governments engaged in massive programs to subsidize rooftop PV systems. By 1988 European 
and Japanese owned firms dominated PV production. (see Appendix Table 5) 
In Japan, the solar industry was created and shaped by electronic corporations based in 
the Kansai region, at a considerable distance from Tokyo, and with a tradition of independence 
from the Japanese government bureaucracy based in Tokyo. The pioneer venture was Sharp. 
This company originated before World War 1 when it was founded by Tokuji Hayakawa as a 
metalworking shop and a vision to make people happy. The company pioneered the Japanese 
production of radios during the 1920s, and after World War 2 diversified into televisions. In 
1953 it launched the first commercial television set, and over the following years also made 
refrigerators and washing machines. In 1961 Sharp began to invest in new product development 
in electronics, and this took the firm into electronic calculators, optical semiconductors, 
computers and solar cells.  Sharp's engineers focused on developing marketable applications for 
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solar cells. This led to use of Sharp solar cells in the No. 1 Tsurumi light buoy in Yokohama Port 
in 1963.112  
As Sharp developed the world’s first electronic calculators, and then office products 
during the 1970s, it continued to invest in PV as a modest part of its business portfolio. Japan’s 
modest space program provided some market for Sharp’s products. In 1976 the Japanese satellite 
"Ume" was launched with Sharp's solar cells on board. However Sharp’s primary focus was 
commercial applications. In 1976 Sharp also introduced the world’s first solar-powered 
calculator. In 1979 the company built a hybrid house powered and heated by solar panels at its R 
& D facility near Nara. None of these activities generated profits, and the continued investment 
appeared to have been motivated by the personal vision of Hayakawa. “I believe the biggest 
issue of the future is the accumulation and storage of solar heat and light,” he wrote in his 1970 
biography “while all living things enjoy the blessings of the sun, we have to rely on electricity 
from power stations. With magnificent heat and light streaming down on us, we must think of 
ways of using those blessings. This is where solar cells come in.”113 In 1982 Sharp entered the 
joint venture with Stanford Ovshinsky’s Energy Conversion Devices, but that was wound up in 
1987. 114 
 A different approach was taken by the Kyocera Corporation, which was founded as 
Kyoto Ceramic Co., Ltd. in 1959 by Kazuo Inamori. Kyocera’s original product was a ceramic 
insulator known as a “kelcima” for use in television picture tubes. The company quickly adapted 
its technologies to produce an expanding range of ceramic components for electronic and 
structural applications. In the 1960s, as the NASA space program, the birth of Silicon Valley and 
the advancement of computer technology created demand for semiconductor integrated circuits , 
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Kyocera developed ceramic semiconductor packages. In the mid-1970s, Kyocera began 
expanding its material technologies to produce a diverse range of applied ceramic products, and 
invested in solar. 
 Inamori’s interest in solar had its origins in his growing awareness of environmental 
problems. Japan’s rapid industrialization during the 1950s and 1960s resulted in growing 
pollution. Inamori noted that the water from his own factories polluted rivers and killed fish, and 
by the late 1960s he was already investing in water purification technology, even though it 
forced up the costs of his still medium-sized company.115 These environmental issues led him 
into solar after a fortuitous encounter with a new technology in the United States. As he later 
described, 
“From various media articles, I knew that some companies such as Sharp and US companies 
had been developing solar cells and that solar power was, though weak, a most ideal 
alternative energy source. Japan had no energy sources and had to import everything 
including coal, oil and natural gas, and I thought it was a weak point of the nation. …I 
became friends of a president of Tyco, a venture company based in Boston. I learned that 
Tyco had successfully developed a technology to pull out a single crystal sapphire – being a 
ceramist I had some expertise in crystallization of minerals. When I heard about this, with 
this technology, I thought it would enable to create various shapes of sapphire.” 116 
 Inamori’s encounter with Tyco came just as the oil shock was hitting Japan, and he 
realized the implications for making solar cells. 
“Till then, solar cell was produced by pulling out single crystal silicon in a cylinder shape 
and slicing the silicon cylinder into pieces, like creating wafer for semiconductor. But Tyco 
people told me that if using their method there would be no need to make silicon in a 
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cylinder shape and no need to slice it. They said they would be able to produce solar cells 
much less expensively by pulling out silicon in a film form.” 117 
He considered producing solar cells using the method, but concluded that  mass production could 
not be done by a single company.  He then contacted the heads of Sharp and Matsushita, leading 
electronics companies, and they set up the Japan Solar Energy Corporation.118 
  The Japanese government, like the US government, became interested in solar energy 
after the oil shocks. In 1974 Project Sunshine was launched to explore alternative energy 
sources. This turned out to be at best ineffective, for the focus was on solar thermal energy, while 
Japan had frequent cloudy skies.119 At worst the government programs were environmentally 
damaging, as the ocean thermal energy conversion technology developed by the Project 
facilitated stratospheric ozone depletion.120 Although Project Sunshine sponsored considerable R 
& D into renewable energy, the government also made no effort at all to translate research into 
actual products. The Japanese government’s reaction to the energy crisis was to work towards 
securing stable oil supplies, and to promote the development of nuclear power, which it insisted 
was a clean energy source. There were yet further obstacles because the country’s ten electric 
companies monopolized the energy market, and had no interest in solar, wind or another 
renewable energy. 121 
 The futility of Japanese energy policy was fully recognized by Inamori, who was 
concerned to keep his distance from government. As he later described,   
“After the oil shock, the Japanese government launched the “Sunshine Project” to promote 
solar cells. But as my basic assumption is that what the government offers is usually not 
good, I was not interested in the project and did not participate. We had a challenge that we 
could not find any demands though we had made some products.” 122 
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Inamori mobilized his engineers at Kyocera to work on the development of solar cells, but it 
proved a lengthy and costly process to pull out silicon in a film form by a roller. The company 
also tried to think of ways to develop a market, developing various products such as solar-
powered batteries for portable radio and road signs. In 1979 the company got its first large order, 
which was for panels to power a microwave telecom relay station located in the Peruvian 
Andres.123 As the memory of the oil shocks faded, and costs stubbornly refused to come down, 
the solar joint venture stumbled, and Kyocera remained the sole owner. Inamori again found a 
foreign technology which could help. Wacker, the German electronics company, had a 
developed multi-crystal silicon wafer. Inamori scraped all his firm’s existing production facilities 
and shifted to multi-crystal approach which produced silicon ingot by molding, which would in 
time become a major production method for solar cells. The Shiga Yohkaichi Factory was 
established in 1980, and manufacturing of solar cells started with mass production of multi-
crystalline silicon solar cells two years later. In 1993 Kyocera achieved a 19.5 % world record 
efficiency with single-crystal silicon solar cells.124 
Meanwhile, Inamori took a lead in developing a new market for solar. As he later described,  
“I thought that in order to create demand, solar panels for houses would be most influential. 
Utility companies had firmly opposed to the introduction of solar panels to individual 
houses. Therefore, I organized the Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association in 1987 involving 
solar cell manufacturers such as Sanyo, Matsushita, Sharp and Kyocera, and started to lobby 
the government for allowing and supporting houses to install solar cells.” 125 
              By then a third Kansai-based electronics company, Sanyo, had also developed a large 
solar business. It also employed solar cells in its calculators, but did not use crystalline silicon 
but thin film technology. This was not as efficient converting sunlight into electricity, but 
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performed well when applied under electronic light. The huge growth of the solar–powered 
calculator market resulted in Sanyo emerging as the world’s largest solar cell manufacturer by 
1986.126 
  The lobbying of the Japan Solar Energy Corporation eventually produced results. In 
1994 the Japanese government, heavily influenced by a German program introduced two years 
previously, launched the Ten Thousand Roofs Program under which the government paid one-
third of the installation cost for household roof—mounted PV panels; funds for the program were 
collected through an electricity surcharge. Local electric utilities had to purchase excess power 
generated by the PV systems at the retail price of electricity. In 1997 another law, the Law on 
Special Measures to Promote Use of New Energies, provided further subsidies. Although 
Japanese government remained stubbornly attached to fossil fuels and nuclear power, the new 
laws provided a more favorable context for solar energy. Over the following years Japan became 
the largest solar cell producing country in the world, accounting for 40 per cent of world 
production. Between 1992 and 2000 the number of rooftop solar systems expanded from 1 to 
50,000, but most of the PV production was exported. Sharp, Kyocera, Sanyo and Mitsubishi, 
grew to be among the top ten PV manufacturers in the world.127 
 In Europe there was, as in Japan, an early interest in the potential of PV solar energy. As 
in Japan, this interest was primarily found in electronics companies. During the second half of 
the 1950s Kees Daey Ouwens, a young engineer at Philips, the leading Dutch electronics 
company, did experimental research on solar cells, powering a transistor radio with one in the 
garden of the physics laboratory of Philips. However interest in the technology waned after the 
discovery of the large gas field at Groningen in 1959. During the 1970s Ouwens continued to 
work on solar at Eindhoven University, despite attempts to silence criticism of nuclear energy by 
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supporters of renewables, and the University hosted conferences on renewable energy, especially 
its use in developing countries. In 1981 a Dutch company, Holecsol, was founded to produce 
solar cells, which was acquired by Shell in the following year.128 
 In Germany, too, the electronics giant Siemens was interested in solar from the 1950s. 
The first achievement by Siemens was the production of ultrapure monocrystalline silicon using 
zonal heating. This innovation was followed by the invention of a reactor, a thermal 
decomposition furnace, which enabled the production of polycrystalline silicon. Both 
technologies became widely used in the semiconductor and PV industries. 129 
As elsewhere, the oil price rises of the 1970s increased interest in several European 
countries on alternatives to fossil fuels. In France, as in the United States, the government 
became engaged in solar energy research. In 1975 the CNRS, the state research agency, built a 
1000-kw solar furnace at Odeillo, the world’s largest, high up in the French Pyrenees, while the 
French space agency began research on thin-film solar cells in Toulouse.130 French oil companies 
also looked at the solar industry. CFP, the largest French oil company, began investing in solar 
energy research in 1975, along with a US firm, Photon Power, but this was soon abandoned. In 
1983 it returned to solar by establishing Total Énergie in Africa with a mission to develop 
renewable energy resources. It began manufacturing solar modules in South Africa in 1996, and 
by the end of the decade had acquired large franchises in Morocco, and developed a European 
business.131 The firm of Photowatt was established by Elf Acquitaine, another oil company, and 
Compagnie General des Eaux, a utility company, but this struggled also until a scientist, Claude 
Rémy, took control in 1979.132 It moved into the US market and by 1982 had a production 
facility in Phoenix, Arizona.133 By 1988 it accounted for about 2 per cent of world production, 
and was ranked in the top nine solar firms (see Appendix Table 5).134  
45	
	
In Italy, there was considerable scientific interest research in solar power, associated 
especially with Giovanni Francia’s experiments with concentration type solar thermal employing 
flat mirrors. Ansaldo, the large electrical machinery company, began PV production during the 
1970s, although subsequently withdrew because of unprofitability. The national electric utility 
ENEL built the world’s first large concentrating-type solar plant in Sicily in 1980, but it was 
closed down after some years of tests.135 There were also start-ups. In 1981 Helios Technology 
was founded near Padua by Franco Traverso to manufacture PVs. He was a mechanical engineer, 
whose father owned a small plastics company, who became “fascinated by the idea of producing 
energy from the sun.” He met a professor from the University of Padua, who worked in silicon 
technology and had contacts in the United States which provided the technology for the new 
venture. Traverso sought his first customers among the owners of country houses in remote rural 
areas where solar power offered a solution as a source of electricity, and used residues from the 
semiconductor industry as raw material before inventing a means to recover silicon from used 
electronic devices.136 Helios was one of the world’s top nine solar producers by 1988, albeit with 
a small output. (see Appendix Table 5). Six years later Photowatt held 2.6 per cent of the world 
market, and Helios 1.4 per cent.137 
On a smaller scale, small firms were also founded in Spain. A socialist government led 
by Felipe Gonzales from 1977 to 1982 took some legislative steps to promote renewable energy, 
although allocated few financial measures. It did seem to stimulate some interest in the solar 
business.  In 1981 Isofoton was founded in Malaga out of a university project led by a professor 
from the Polytechnic University of Madrid build PV cells from silicon wafers technology. In 
1983 the firm Atersa was created as a result of the merger four years previously of two small 
solar distributors. It developed a small manufacturing business which included installation of PV 
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systems to provide rural electricity and water pumps and public lighting systems. In 1984 the 
long-established engineering firm of Abengoa, based in Seville, which had provided equipment 
for electricity grids, built some of the components for a solar platform, which began a growing 
investment in the industry. Felipe Benjumea, the son of the founder, started working in the 
company in the early 1980s, and had developed an interest in environmental issues, particularly 
global warming. He decided to invest in renewable energy, and to make “greenness” the new 
core philosophy of the company. Absent of government support, however, the business was 
largely abroad, begin with a contract for equipment for the Weizmann Institute of Science in 
Israel. 138 
In Britain, where an official report had been skeptical about the prospects of solar energy 
as early as 1952, the oil crisis revived interest. The country’s Department of Energy 
commissioned a study on the potential of solar energy, which was published in 1976. It 
concluded that if sufficient investment was made, it was possible to envisage solar energy 
contributing 2 per cent of the country’s energy needs within 25 years.139 However momentum 
was quickly lost as the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea accelerated. BP found gas off 
the coast of East Anglia in 1965. Ten years later the large Argyle and Forties oilfields were 
discovered.  By the early 1980s Britain had become a net exporter of oil, and by the mid-1990s 
of gas. The government, controlled by the right-wing Conservative Party between 1979 and 
1997, had few concerns about either the environmental effects of fossil fuels or the security of 
energy supplies. 
It was Germany which became the first European country to adopt a formal renewable 
energy policy. This originated in 1974 and was primarily initially focused on research. 
Government spending on solar began modestly, given that boosting nuclear and coal production 
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were the core priorities. The equivalent of EUR10 million was spent on solar energy in 1974. 
This had risen to EUR60 million in 1978, and peaked at EUR150 million in 1982.140 The 
Chernobyl accident in 1986 had a huge impact in Germany, and stimulated increased support for 
alternative energies. In 1990 the government launched a 1,000 roof program for PVs under 
which the federal government provided 50 per cent of the investment costs plus a further 20 per 
cent from the state (Lander) governments. Some 2,250 roofs were equipped with PV modules. In 
1991 a feed-in-tariff was introduced which required utilities to connect alternative energy 
generators to the grid, and buy their electricity at agreed rates set at 80 per cent of the historical 
average retail price. The program was capped at 5 per cent. This provided incentives to investors, 
although less for solar because of its high expense. The feed-in tariff rates were under the cost of 
producing PV cells, although several Lander continued to support solar installations for special 
purposes, like schools.141 
The German policy for renewables provided the context for the further investment by 
Siemens in the solar industry. In the early 1980s, Siemens was part of the first terrestrial 
application of solar power, participating in a European Union project to install a solar power 
plant using monocrystalline solar cells on the Greek island of Kythnos. Siemens developed the 
first thin-film technology based on hydrogenated amorphous silicon. In 1990 Siemens acquired 
Arco Solar, taking over its investment in thin film technology based on copper indium 
diselenide. The size of the German market could not match that of the American at that time, and 
Siemens proceeded to close down its domestic production in favor of its American plants, and 
focused on supplying markets in the developing world. By 1996, based on crystalline silicon 
wafer technology, Siemens Solar Industries accounted for one-fifth of the total installed PV 
capacity worldwide, at the time equal to 100 megawatts.142 The other two manufacturers in 
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Germany were divisions of other big companies, Nukem – a uranium services company – and 
DASA, an aerospace company. In 1994 these firms spun off their solar divisions to form a new 
company, Applied Solar Energy (ASE).143 
Although the German policy regime for solar and renewable was modest compared to 
what would come later, it contrasted with that followed in other European countries, which was 
even less supportive of renewables. In Britain, for example, support for renewable energy began 
almost accidently in 1990 with the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). This was a device 
established to provide financial support for nuclear power when the British electricity system 
was privatized, and was funded from a levy placed on all consumers. The newly privatized 
Regional Electricity Companies, or RECs, were obliged to purchase power from generators at a 
premium price, and renewable energy such as solar and wind got included in the arrangement. 
The levy receipts were used to reimburse the RECs for the difference between this premium and 
the average monthly ‘pool’ purchasing price. Developers were invited to submit competitive bids 
for NFFO contracts. This auction system, which was quite different from feed-in-tariffs, and 
primarily designed to force down costs, lasted for two decades. It proved more of a problem than 
an opportunity for renewables. Tendering in successive rounds created batches of parallel 
projects. The system also encouraged gaming as there was no penalty for companies who won at 
auction but did not take up a contract, which encouraged firms to bid low simply to prevent 
competitors from securing contracts. Both the complexity of the planning process, and the 
uncertainties of success, deterred entrepreneurial entrants, which differed considerably from the 
German experience.144 
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In Germany, the structure of electricity distribution, which was privatized in 1998, 
facilitated further experimentation with solar energy. Four large companies -  E.ON, RWE, 
Vatenfall and EnBW – generated four-fifths of the country’s electric power, while the remainder 
was generated by a thousand or so local electric utilities, typically owned by the towns which 
they served.145 This structure provided an opening for local environmental activists to lobby city 
councils for a system whereby the private owners of solar systems could feed the electricity they 
generated into the public grid, receiving sufficient in return to maintain their systems and make a 
small profit. After several towns had taken this route, it was approved by the government of the 
Lander of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1994, and then spread. By 1997 forty two German towns 
had such systems.146  
These events provided a backdrop for new measures following the election of a new 
Federal coalition government composed of Social Democrats and the Green Party in 1998. A 
new 100,000 roof program was in place between 1999 and 2003. The Renewable Energy Sources 
Act in 2000 established a revised feed-in-tariff regime which, among other measures, fixed rates 
for 20 years. This Act decoupled feed-in tariff process from retail rates and instead based process 
on the cost of production. The cap on renewables was removed.147 The profit incentive for 
houses to adopt solar systems worked as an effective inducement. By 2008 an estimated half a 
million German roofs had solar systems.148 Critics complained that the promotion of solar 
industry in a country with the same amount of sunshine as Alaska made limited sense.	They also 
noted that it was richer people, whether house owners or farmers, who could put solar panels on 
their roofs, while the less affluent who lived in apartment blocks simply got higher electricity 
prices.149 
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While in Japan the growth in the solar market spurred the growth of existing PV 
manufacturers, this did not happen in Germany, nor in Europe as a whole. Instead, a new set of 
entrepreneurial actors emerged. In 1996 Reiner Lemoine founded Solon. Lemoine was an 
aerospace engineer, with an early commitment to radical ethical and environmental issues. He 
had founded an engineering company in Berlin called Wuseltronik after graduating in 1978 
which built measuring devices for wind and solar applications. It was run as a collective, and on 
the basis of high ethical principles, which included refusing to accept contract work from the 
army. In 1996 he co-founded another company, Solon, to assemble PV modules, which two 
years later became a public company, with the corporate slogan “Don’t leave the planet to the 
stupid.” It was initially planned for Solon to make solar cells in its own factory in Berlin, but 
Lemoine could not raise sufficient capital. After finding that the solar cells which it then had to 
acquire from outside suppliers were of variable quality, Lemoine and his colleagues left Solon to 
form their own specialist cell manufacturer, Q-Cells. This was an innovation in the traditional 
PV industry structure, which had always seen companies combine wafer manufacture, cell 
production and module assembly.150  
Q-Cells was one of several German solar start-ups. Solar Millenium was founded in 1998 
in Erlangen, Germany, and focused on the design and implementation of solar thermal power 
plants. SolarWorld was launched as a company in 1998, this time in Bonn, as a business run by 
Frank H. Asbeck, was one of the founders of the Green Party in Germany, and had started up an 
engineering bureau for industrial plants ten years previously. One of its businesses was 
renewable energies. SolarWorld began as a distributor of solar modules. It went public in 1999 
and began building its own production facilities. One year later, it bought the chemicals and 
pharmaceutical giant Bayer's solar energy unit in Freiberg.151 
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The German solar boom also attracted established companies. Schott, a long-established 
glass and ceramic manufacturer, had had a small interest in PVs since the late 1950s. In 2001 it 
entered the sector on a larger scale. In 2002 it acquired a 50 per cent share of RWE Solar, the 
former ASE, and took complete ownership three years later, which made it one of the top ten PV 
manufacturers in the world. In contrast, in 2000 Siemens put its solar interests into a joint 
venture with Shell and the German electrical utility E.ON. In the following year Shell Solar 
acquired all of Siemens Solar.152 
As in the United States, although somewhat later, European oil companies had become 
interested in solar energy during the 1970s as they pursued the then fashionable strategy of 
diversification. In 1973, Shell moved into nuclear energy by forming a partnership with Gulf Oil 
to manufacture gas-cooled reactors and their fuels. The initial cost was a hefty $200 million, but 
Shell quickly discovered that the political problems of the oil industry were multiplied in the 
nuclear industry, particularly after the accident at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979. 
The following year Shell sold its interests. During the 1970s a large coal business was also 
acquired by Shell. This business also proved volatile, and was abandoned during the late 
1990s.153  
Shell’s early steps into renewable energy were more modest. It entered solar heating with 
the acquisition of a 50 per cent interest in an Australian company Solarhart in 1979. This Perth 
company, originally a plumbing and ironworks venture, had developed a solar heating business 
in the 1950s, and built a nation-wide dealer network selling solar water heaters.154 Two years 
later Shell acquired the Dutch company, Holecsol. In the same year Shell’s distributor in Japan, 
Showa Oil, entered the solar business, and this became a significant part of Shell’s Japanese 
52	
	
business when it consolidated its businesses in that country in 1985 to form Showa Shell Sekiyu 
K.K.155 In 1997, as the withdrawal from coal approached, Shell ramped up its renewable 
investment by establishing a new core business, which it publically announced that it planned to 
invest half a billion dollars in over the following five years. Shell’s activities in solar power, 
biomass power and forestry were consolidated in a new organization, Shell International 
Renewables. In 1999 wholly owned subsidiaries were established in solar energy systems in 
India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, targeted at rural electrification programs, and solar home 
systems were introduced in South Africa. In the next year Shell opened another solar-panel 
manufacturing operation in Germany, in a joint venture with the British glass company 
Pilkington, to add to its plants in the Netherlands and Japan. The firm’s Annual Report in 2000 
announced the explicit strategy to become a global leader in Renewable Energy. By then Shell 
was the world’s fourth largest supplier of solar panels in a market which is growing by around 25 
per cent a year.156 
 BP, Europe’s other major global oil company, also entered solar energy. In 1981 it 
formed a solar joint venture with the British engineering company Lucas Industries, and it 
acquired full-ownership in the following year. In 1986 it acquired Standard Oil of Ohio, which 
had an investment in Ovshinsky’s amorphous materials and thin-film technology, but the British 
company opted to end the relationship and instead focus on commercializing silicon crystal 
panels instead.157	By 1994 it was the second largest European-owned PV manufacturer after 
Siemens, holding the third largest world market share. While Siemens dominated with 20 per 
cent of the world market, Solarex held 9.7 per cent and BP 9.3. Sanyo, the largest Japanese 
company, was in fourth place with 7.9 per cent.158 BP had been in the forefront of solar 
development in many countries, opening a panel manufacturing plant in Madrid, Spain, as early 
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as 1983, for example. During the mid-1990s BP launched into that market the first 100 Kw solar 
panel, the most efficient panels at that time, and by 1998 the BP Solar operated in 16 countries.  
By 2001, when BP Solar opened the largest solar plant in Spain at that time, it had acquired 
Amoco, including its share of Solarex as well as that of Enron, making BP Solar the world’s 
second largest PV manufacturer after Sharp. 
 By 2001, as Appendix Table 5 shows, the list of the largest PV cell manufacturers was 
overwhelmingly European and Asian, with US-ownership decimated. However the United States 
was still in second place as a manufacturing country after Japan, as the foreign firms which had 
acquired U.S. firms continued to operate American production facilities. In contrast, the Japanese 
firms produced all of their PV cells in Japan. Shell’s business structure in solar was noticeably 
global. It had manufacturing facilities in the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, and the US, and a 
sales network on all continents.  
 
A New Solar Boom and Bust 
The decade after 2000 saw a remarkable boom in solar energy, only be followed by a 
spectacular bust for many corporations engaged in it. The boom was driven by a renewed bout of 
government subsidization of solar energy as concerns about, and evidence of, climate change 
mounted. In Europe, the example of the German	Renewable	Energy	Sources	Act	and	its	feed-in 
tariff program was followed by Spain, Italy, France and several other countries.159 In Spain, 
where the level of support became the most generous, there were feed-in tariffs, government 
investment subsidies and soft loans, and regional authority subsidies often covered between 15 
per cent and 50 per cent of total investment. Many large cities in Spain have approved 
regulations requiring the obligatory installation of solar PV on new buildings and some regional 
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energy plans prioritized the use of PV.160 By 2009 the share of electricity generated by solar in 
Spain was the highest in the world. (Appendix Table 1) 
There were also new US policies to support solar. A slow rise in environmental concerns  
began under the Presidency of George Bush beginning in 1989. This continued during the 
Clinton Administration between 1993 and 2000, although there were few concrete measures to 
support renewable energy beyond an increase in gasoline taxes.161 Clinton’s successor, George 
W Bush, quietly installed solar systems in the White House in 2002, and three years later the 
Investment Tax Credit allowed businesses to invest in solar power projects and receive a tax 
credit for up to 30 per of the expense. As a short-term remedy to the almost annual 
reauthorization quest for the ITC, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 extended 
the 30 per cent solar investment tax credit for eight years to 2016, and removed the prohibition 
against utility company use of the ITC, thus allowing them to take advantage of the credit. There 
was also substantial support at the state level for solar energy. In 2007 the state of California also 
launched the California Solar Initiative, which offered substantial incentives to get solar panels 
on domestic roofs. It was joined by a group of other states, including New Mexico, Colorado and 
Arizona, and less sunny states such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. 
China made a rapid entry into solar industry in order to build a presence in an industry 
deemed to be strategic. A Renewable Energy Law in 2005 was designed to promote the 
development and utilization of renewable energy, and safeguard energy security. Renewable 
energy was subsidized by a fee charged to all electricity users in China of 0.029 cents per 
kilowatt-hour. The fee was originally based on the incremental difference between coal and 
renewable energy, and went to the companies which operate the electricity grid and must buy 
renewable power from project developers. The Renewable Energy Law was amended in 2009 to 
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require electricity grid companies to buy all the electricity produced by renewable energy 
generators. A “Golden Roofs” initiative also announced in 2009 provided a subsidy of $2.93 per 
watt for roof-mounted PV systems over 50 kilowatts which could cover over half of a system’s 
installation cost. A feed-in tariff of $0.16 per kilowatt-hour was also established for PV power 
projects at the same time. Encouragement for larger utility scale solar projects was announced in 
the same year under the “Golden Sun” program, which provided for up to 50 per cent of project 
costs, and up to 70 per cent of such costs for projects in more remote areas. Provinces also 
provided local incentives for solar development.162  
None of these measures meant, however, that much Chinese electricity was generated by 
solar. As Appendix Table 1 shows, solar remained an inconsequential source of electricity. In the 
big picture, the Chinese government believed that solar was too expensive to become a major 
solution for Chinese energy requirements, and in so far as the government seriously promoted 
renewables, the focus was on wind and biofuel.163 	
The growth of subsidies resulted in a surge of growth in PV installation and manufacture. 
(Appendix Tables 2 and 4) There was a steady fall in the price of solar cells. In California, costs 
were estimated to have fallen 5 per cent annually between the mid-1990s and 2006. However this 
still left it expensive: electricity produced by crystalline cells was estimated by 2006 to have a 
total cost of 20 to 25 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared with four to six cents for coal-fired 
electricity, five to seven cents for power produced by burning natural gas, and six to nine cents 
for biomass power plants.164 
The solar boom resulted in significant structural shifts in the industry. The first was the  
emergence of specialist polysilicon manufacturers. Polysilicon prices soared until a sudden crash 
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in 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis. The market was controlled by a handful of large 
corporations, with seven firms accounting for roughly three-quarters of polysilicon production.165 
Secondly, there were major changes in the ownership of PV manufacturing. The solar 
boom stimulated the rapid growth of entrepreneurial specialist solar PV manufactures. By 2006 
the recently founded Q-Cells was the second largest producer in the world after Sharp, and ahead 
of Kyocera. It attracted large financial backing from venture capitalists, beginning with Good 
energies, an affiliate of the investment business s of the Brenninkmeijer family, the owners of the 
C & A retail chain.166 The company’s market valuation reached $10 billion in 2007. Other 
German start-ups including Solon, Solar Millennium and Solarhybrid grew rapidly. During the 
first half of the decade the estimated return on investment in the German solar power industry 
was between 10 and 13 per cent.167  
In the United States, there was also renewed growth by local firms, who often initially 
supplied the booming European market. The leading U.S. firm was First Solar, an Arizona 
company which had been started by the inventor Harold McMaster, who formed Solar Cells, Inc 
in 1990 with the aim of making thin film cells on a large scale. In 1999 it was purchased by True 
North Partners, LLC, the investment arm of the Walton family, who owned WalMart, who 
rebranded it as First Solar. The company grew rapidly on sales to Germany, and went public in 
2006. There was also a new wave of start-ups in the United States. In 2005 Solyndra launched, 
supported by $1 billion of private equity funds, and employing a strategy to use cylindrical cells, 
rather than flat PV solar panels. In 2009 the company received a $535 million loan guarantee 
from the Federal government in the stimulus package after the financial crisis.   
The most spectacular change was the rapid entry and growth of state-owned Chinese 
firms. While the Chinese government was lukewarm at best about the prospects of solar energy 
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inside China, it was strongly supportive of the growth of Chinese firms in the global industry. It 
provided Chinese firms with both low interest rate loads and favorable deals for land to buy 
factories. The firms themselves were effective at acquiring new technologies, often using their 
initial position as original equipment manufacturers to Western firms to gain knowledge and 
market know-how. The Chinese firms were highly internationalized, selling most of the 
production internationally. They were bought foreign companies; in 2006 Suntech acquired two-
thirds of a Japanese company, MSK, which held a 5 per cent share of the Japanese solar market. 
By 2011 the list of the largest PV manufacturers in the world was dominated by Chinese firms 
led by LDK Solar and Suntech.168 
In contrast, the falling prices of solar cells and the entry of Chinese manufacturers 
encouraged the exit of the big European oil companies out of the industry. In 2006 both Shell 
and BP were still amongst the top ten PV manufacturers. However Shell had already begun 
divesting from solar in the previous year. In 2010 the firm’s chief executive noted regarding the 
firm’s investments in renewables:  
“We need to grow in areas that are profitable and match our core skills. I saw thousands of Dutch 
shareholders recently [at an annual shareholders convention] and I asked them if they wanted 
wind power or a financial return. The answer is clear! That’s one of the problems – I’m open to 
critics, but I have a business to run, and the purpose of a business is to achieve returns, to achieve 
long-term sustainable growth. As part of that we are prepared to invest in Research & 
Development, including in alternative energies. But our activities need to give us profitability. 
We’re a company like any other and we need to make a profit in order to exist.”169 In 2011 BP 
followed Shell by announcing its withdrawal from the industry. 
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 Beginning with the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, the PV manufacturing 
business came under severe stress from three sources. First, the growing availability of natural 
gas and other fossil fuels sharply reduced the perceived urgency for investment in renewable 
energy. In particular, new techniques such as “fracking” and horizontal drilling triggered a 
production boom in natural gas which promised plentiful low-cost power and energy 
independence for decades in the future. The discourse about the potential of natural gas was not 
unlike the discussions fifty years previously about nuclear energy, and in both cases 
environmental downsides were not articulated in the early stages. Fracking had the potential to 
pollute ground water and even trigger earthquakes, but there was little doubt that the availability 
of abundant and cheap natural case made the case for supporting renewable energy harder to 
make. This was especially because the momentum behind concerns about climate change had 
waned once more, despite a strong consensus among scientists that such change was happening. 
The specifics of the nature of such change remained insufficiently inexact for governments to 
feel comfortable to prioritize responding to more immediate financial and economic pressures. 
 Second, the business models of the major Western PV manufacturers were disrupted by 
falling prices as capacity increased, especially but not only driven by low-cost Chinese firms. In 
2011 the price of solar panels fell by almost one-half. In 2011 many US solar companies went 
bankrupt, including Solyndra and Evergreen Solar, which had developed a novel string ribbon 
technology to use silicon more efficiently, which it had struggled to commercialize, despite large 
subsidies from the state of Massachusetts.170 However this crisis did not deter deeper-pocketed 
firms from continuing to invest. During 2011 and 2012 GE invested an approximate $1.4 billion 
in solar energy as part of its renewable energy business. By that year GE had investments in solar 
projects worth $5bn across Australia, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States, and 
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was also building what would be the largest US solar panel factory, a 400-MW solar plant in 
Colorado.171 
            Third, the crisis in the Euro currency area after the global financial crisis resulted in a 
sudden fall in subsidies and other support in Europe. The Spanish market for renewables fell 
dramatically as subsidies were reduced. In France, subsidies were frozen in 2010, and in the 
following year the government introduced a new system whereby only small roofs would 
continue to benefit from feed-in tariffs, but at a lower rate. Larger installations had to go through 
a complex and capped tender process. A new target of 5.4 GW of installed capacity by 2020 was 
ten times lower than in Germany. Photowatt went bankrupt in 2011. However, large French 
diversified business groups capable of cross-subsidizing renewable energy increased their 
investments in solar by acquiring the assets of other firms. In 2006 the French glass maker Saint 
Gobain acquired Shell’s business in France, and five years later Total, the largest French oil 
company, expanded its solar business by acquiring the majority of SunPower, an engineering 
company which had become the second largest American solar panel maker.172 
The decimation of the German solar industry was striking. In 2012 the German 
government’s decision to cut the fixed price that power companies had to buy solar power from 
producers by up to 30 per cent resulted in Q-Cells, Solon, Solar Millenium, Solarhybrid, 
Scheuten Solar, and Odersun going bankrupt within a few months of each other. They were 
joined by Solar Millenium, which didn’t even make PV cells, but rather thermal power plants.173 
SolarWorld, which had grown through acquiring Shell’s crystalline silicon business and (in 
2007) a large manufacturing plant in Oregon formerly owned by a Japan’s Komatsu, continued 
in business, but the bankruptcies of so many German firms demonstrated with remarkable clarity 
the capability of subsidies to skew the development path of the solar industry. Subsidies created 
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a huge demand for PVs in Germany, but they also blinkered managements from the need to shift 
production to lower cost sites as Chinese competition grew. Q Cells continued to manufacture in 
Bitterfeld-Wolfen, Germany until 2011, when it began outsourcing part of its production to 
Malaysia. Perversely, the German government also subsidized Chinese solar companies, 
according to some estimates up to €100 million, as part of development aid seeking to promote 
China's green industries.174 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In each generation, the concept of getting “power from sunshine” attracted 
entrepreneurial visionaries such as Aubrey Eneas, Frank Shuman, George Keck, Elliot Berman, 
Bill Yerkes, Ishaq Shahryar, Franco Traverso, Tokuji Hayakawa, Kazuo Inamori, and Reiner 
Lemoine. They were sometimes motivated by broad social and environmental agendas, including 
seeking to bring electricity to communities which had no access to it, and providing responsible 
stewardship over the world’s resources and its climate.  
These entrepreneurs encountered a perennial problem; solar energy was expensive 
compared to conventional fuels which were not priced to incorporate wider environmental costs. 
The invention of PV cells in the 1950s, the “space age electronic marvel,” transformed the 
potential of solar energy, but also vastly raised the financing stakes as the new technology 
proved complicated, and very expensive. Niche markets were found, in satellites and pocket 
calculators, but the widespread use of solar to generate electricity required government subsidies 
and other support in a world where the environmental costs of fossil fuels were not included in 
pricing. This proved a huge liability.  
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Solar firms found themselves in a perennial dilemma. Although innovation was driven by 
firms, solar like other renewables needed supportive and consistent government policies to 
compete against conventional fuels, and to continue to invest so costs kept falling. However 
promoting solar, or other renewables, was seldom the top priority of governments concerned 
about the prices charged to consumers and economic growth, and subject to lobbying by 
established large vested interests with no interest in changes to the energy mix. In the United 
States, the space program was a key customer during the 1950s and 1960s, but this market was 
only for exceptionally high quality products, whilst energy policy as a whole was dominated by 
policies which favored fossil fuels and nuclear energy. During the late 1970s and 1980s, in the 
wake of the oil price rises, PURPA and state governments such as California finally offered real 
opportunities for renewable such as solar, but changing ideologies and falling fossil fuel prices 
meant that this support was not sustained. The Japanese and German PV roof policies during the 
1990s were important for the growth of solar energy businesses. Government policies also 
explain the growth of the Chinese solar firms during the 2000s.  
Governments were, however, typically fickle and regularly misguided when it came to 
renewable energy. US government policies were rarely consistent for any length of time, and 
each shifted disrupted the industry. Policies to promote national firms for strategic purposes, as 
in China over the last decade, were equally as disruptive for long–term development. There were 
only a limited number of situations, as in California in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or 
Germany in the 2000s, when governments and their electorates were prepared to pay more for 
the electricity which renewable energies produced. However these policies also encouraged rent-
seeking and short-term strategies to capture financial gains, or else - as in the recent case of 
Germany – blinded managers to the need to respond to changing cost structures. An idealized 
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governance structure for the development of the industry would have been internationally 
coordinated policies to promote renewable energy through incentives and, especially, pricing 
fossil and nuclear energy to include their environmental costs. There remained no prospect 
whatsoever of this happening in reality.    
Deep pockets were necessary to develop PV technology. From the 1960s electronics and 
oil companies became important sources of financial and managerial resources, and they 
orchestrated many of the major technological developments which have led to the remarkable 
fall in the cost of PV cells overtime. Contrary to some conspiracy theorists, the oil companies did 
not invest in solar technology to block it. As one study observed, “as the hundreds of millions of 
dollars (the oil companies) invested demonstrate, they remained true believers for far longer than 
made financial sense.”175 A downside was that these large companies also made entry by more 
entrepreneurial firms difficult, as they were willing for long periods to subsidize heavy losses. 
Solar was also only a part of their portfolios. They assembled production and research assets, 
invested in them, and then sold them as circumstances changed. These changes in corporate 
ownership added to the uncertainties of an industry whose success always seemed to be just 
around the corner, as creative destruction became the industry norm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63	
	
Appendix 
Table 1 Electricity Generation by Energy Source in Selected Countries at benchmark dates 
1975-2009 (Thousands GW and % Share). 
	
Country	 Product	 1975	 1980 1990 2000 2008 2009	
Canada	 	Electricity	
Generated	
273236	 367206 467733 586651 621310 585036	
Nuclear	%	 4.340		 9.771	 14.717	 11.707	 14.266	 14.580		
Hydro	%	 74.074		 68.353	 62.837	 60.525	 59.664	 61.596		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.003	 0.006	 0.017		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.044	 0.596	 0.774		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
21.586		 21.875	 22.441	 27.716	 25.463	 23.027		
United	States	 	Electricity	
Generated	
1918644	 2286106 3029842 3816731 4152092 3978759	
Nuclear	%	 8.996		 10.984	 19.043	 19.752	 19.417	 20.078		
Hydro	%	 15.647		 12.074	 9.443	 7.205	 6.746	 7.446		
Geothermal%	 0.169		 0.222	 0.499	 0.369	 0.357	 0.377		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.022	 0.018	 0.048	 0.061		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.100	 0.147	 1.333	 1.857		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
75.188		 76.720	 70.894	 72.509	 72.079	 70.165		
Denmark	 	Electricity	
Generated	
17128	 25173 24282 34448 34846 35448	
Nuclear	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		
Hydro	%	 0.140		 0.119	 0.115	 0.087	 0.075	 0.055		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.003	 0.009	 0.012		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.044	 2.512	 12.311	 19.882	 19.511		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
99.860		 99.837	 97.373	 87.485	 80.035	 80.423		
France	 	Electricity	
Generated	
179514	 247671 401335 517887 548827 518173	
Nuclear	%	 9.776		 23.491	 74.239	 76.458	 76.217	 75.264		
Hydro	%	 33.263		 28.104	 14.115	 13.725	 12.326	 11.802		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.001	 0.007	 0.033		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.015	 1.037	 1.523		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
56.674		 48.206	 11.505	 9.691	 10.321	 11.283		
Germany	 	Electricity	
Generated	
360320	 437628 509582 538489 599916 556836	
Nuclear	%	 6.457		 12.020	 28.390	 29.844	 23.494	 22.931		
Hydro	%	 5.028		 4.583	 3.819	 4.755	 4.425	 4.364		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.003	 0.003		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.011	 0.738	 1.181		
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Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.014	 1.737	 6.775	 6.939		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
88.515		 83.397	 67.777	 63.653	 64.565	 63.439		
Israel	 	Electricity	
Generated	
9068	 11642	 19621	 40568	 53021	 50539	
Nuclear	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Hydro	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.015	 0.076	 0.030		 0.044		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.047		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.017		 0.018		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
100.000		 100.000	 99.985	 99.924	 99.538		 99.361		
Italy	 	Electricity	
Generated	
140935	 177392	 205064	 263305	 307065	 281106	
Nuclear	%	 2.564		 1.166	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Hydro	%	 30.052		 26.631	 16.857	 19.076	 15.200		 18.798		
Geothermal%	 1.654		 1.448	 1.491	 1.677	 1.693		 1.784		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.002	 0.007	 0.063		 0.240		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.001	 0.214	 1.580		 2.307		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
65.730		 70.755	 81.649	 78.743	 81.177		 76.663		
Netherlands	
		
		
		
		
		
		
	Electricity	
Generated	
51924	 61970	 69427	 86029	 103376	 108946	
Nuclear	%	 6.090		 6.369	 4.746	 4.297	 3.803		 3.671		
Hydro	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.122	 0.165	 0.099		 0.090		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.009	 0.037		 0.042		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.081	 0.964	 4.121		 4.205		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
93.910		 93.631	 95.051	 94.278	 91.798		 91.873		
Portugal	
		
		
		
		
		
		
	Electricity	
Generated	
10409	 14726	 27284	 42215	 45579	 48718	
Nuclear	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Hydro	%	 60.765		 53.844	 33.492	 27.424	 16.147		 18.273		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.007	 0.015	 0.190	 0.381		 0.333		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.004	 0.002	 0.085		 0.328		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.004	 0.396	 12.845		 15.485		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
39.235		 46.150	 66.486	 71.989	 70.542		 65.582		
Spain	
		
		
		
		
		
		
	Electricity	
Generated	
79522	 105212	 145648	 214441	 302543	 282871	
Nuclear	%	 9.223		 4.664	 35.905	 27.906	 18.669		 17.817		
Hydro	%	 33.682		 28.899	 17.849	 14.669	 8.491		 10.133		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.004	 0.008	 0.845		 2.135		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.010	 2.193	 10.660		 13.027		
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All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
57.095		 66.437	 46.232	 55.223	 61.240		 56.771		
United	
Kingdom	
	Electricity	
Generated	
253880	 266312	 300128	 360765	 373402	 359190	
Nuclear	%	 10.423		 12.125	 19.546	 21.713	 12.801		 17.473		
Hydro	%	 1.937		 1.913	 2.360	 2.124	 2.473		 2.478		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.0003	 0.005		 0.006		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.003	 0.262	 1.906		 2.590		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
87.640		 85.962	 78.091	 75.900	 82.815		 77.453		
Australia	 	Electricity	
Generated	
71823	 92468	 144926	 195408	 240177	 241865	
Nuclear	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Hydro	%	 20.823		 14.756	 10.267	 8.556	 5.020		 5.083		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000		 0.000		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.023	 0.067		 0.115		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.030	 1.288		 1.574		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
79.177		 85.244	 89.733	 91.391	 93.626		 93.228		
Japan	 	Electricity	
Generated	
456723	 551778	 809939	 1019265	 1040454	 1007606	
Nuclear	%	 5.176		 14.251	 23.937	 30.282	 23.606		 26.430		
Hydro	%	 18.742		 16.591	 11.742	 9.427	 7.973		 8.098		
Geothermal%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.201	 0.304	 0.242		 0.263		
Solar	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.0001	 0.034	 0.216		 0.274		
Wind	%	 0.000		 0.000	 0.000	 0.011	 0.283		 0.293		
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
76.082		 69.158	 64.120	 59.942	 67.680		 64.642		
India	 	Electricity	
Generated	
NA	 NA	 275000	 NA	 785000	 899389	
Nuclear	%	 NA	 NA	 2.076	 NA	 1.70		 2.07	
Hydro	%	 NA	 NA	 24.913	 NA	 14.60		 11.8	
Geothermal%	 NA	 NA	 0.000	 NA	 0	 0	
Solar	%	 NA	 NA 0.000	 NA 0	 0.003	
Wind	%	 NA	 NA	 0.000	 NA	 1.6	 1.99	
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
NA	 NA	 72.665	 NA	 82.1	 84.04	
China	 	Electricity	
Generated	
NA	 NA	 650000	 NA	 3221000	 3695928	
Nuclear	%	 NA	 NA	 0.000	 NA	 2	 1.89	
Hydro	%	 NA	 NA	 19.538	 NA	 16.2	 16.65	
Geothermal%	 NA	 NA	 0.000	 NA	 0.000	 0.004	
Solar	%	 NA	 NA 0.000	 NA 0.000	 0.008	
Wind	%	 NA	 NA	 0.000	 NA	 0.5	 0.72	
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All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
NA	 NA	 80.462	 NA	 81.3	 80.7	
Brazil	 	Electricity	
Generated	
NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 466468	
Nuclear	%	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 2.7	
Hydro	%	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 83.8	
Geothermal%	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 0.00	
Solar	%	 NA	 NA NA NA NA	 0.000	
Wind	%	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 0.26	
All	
Combustible	
Fuels%		
NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 13.13	
 
 
Source: OECD, World Energy Outlook, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2010, OECD. 
China; India and Brazil data: IEA, International Energy Statistics, Electricity Generation by 
Source 2009. 
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Table 2 Annual Installed Solar Photovoltaic Capacities in Selected Countries and the 
World, 1998-2009 
 
Year                  Germany     Italy Japan U.S. Spain Others W
  ----------------  Megawatts  --------------- 
c1970                  
1998 10 n.a. 69 n.a. 0 76 
1999 12 n.a. 72 17 1 95 
2000 40 n.a. 112 22 n.a. 94 
2001 78 n.a. 135 29 2 90 
2002 80 n.a. 185 44 9 121 
2003 150 n.a. 223 63 10 148 
2004 600 n.a. 272 90 6 84 
2005 850 n.a. 290 114 26 41 
2006 850 10 287 145 88 223 
2007 1,107 70 210 207 560 276 2
2008 2,002 338 230 342 2,605 766 6
2009 3,800 730 484 477 69 1,656 7
 
Source: Earth Policy Institute, http://www.earth-policy.org/?/data_center/C23/ ,retrieved on April 27, 2012; 1960 
data Phech Colatat, Georgeta Vidican, and Richard K. Lester, “Innovation Systems in the Solar Photovoltaic Industry: The Role 
of Public Research Institutions”, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, Working Paper Series, MIT-IPC-09-007, June 2009. 
Table 3 U.S. Solar Photovoltaic Production, 1976-1995 
Year Annual Production Cumulative Production   
 Megawatts   
     
1976 0.3 0.3   
1977 0.4 0.7   
1978 0.8 1.6   
1979 1.2 2.8   
1980 2.5 5.3   
1981 3.5 8.8   
1982 5.2 14.0   
1983 8.2 22.2   
1984 8.0 30.2   
1985 7.7 37.9   
1986 7.1 45.0   
1987 8.7 53.7   
1988 11.1 64.8   
1989 14.1 78.9   
1990 14.8 93.7   
1991 17.1 110.8   
1992 18.1 128.9   
1993 22.4 151.4   
1994 25.6 177.0   
1995 34.8 211.8   
     
Source: EPI, http://www.earth-policy.org/?/data_center/C23/, retrieved on April 27, 2012. 
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Table 4 Annual Solar Photovoltaic Production by Country, 1995-2009 
 
  
        
Year China Japan Taiwan Germany United States Others Total 
 Megawatts 
        
1995 n.a. 16 n.a. n.a. 35 n.a. 78 
1996 n.a. 21 n.a. n.a. 39 n.a. 89 
1997 n.a. 35 n.a. n.a. 51 n.a. 126 
1998 n.a. 49 n.a. n.a. 54 n.a. 155 
1999 n.a. 80 n.a. n.a. 61 n.a. 201 
2000 3 129 n.a. 23 75 48 277 
2001 3 171 4 24 100 70 371 
2002 10 251 8 55 121 97 542 
2003 13 364 17 122 103 131 749 
2004 40 602 39 193 139 186 1,199 
2005 128 833 88 339 153 241 1,782 
2006 342 926 170 469 178 374 2,459 
2007 864 938 387 744 269 545 3,746 
2008 2,013 1,268 813 1,334 401 1,261 7,089 
2009 3,782 1,508 1,439 1,364 587 2,000 10,680 
Notes: n.a. = data not available. Rows may not add to totals due to rounding.  
Source: EPI, http://www.earth-policy.org/?/data_center/C23/, retrieved on April 27, 20 
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Table 5: Solar Manufacturer rankings and world market share at benchmark dates: 1988-
2011 
 
Year	 Company	 Country World	production	(%)
	
	
	
	
1988	
Siemens	Solar	 Germany 17.5
Solec/Sanyo	 Japan 16.5
Solarex	 U.S. 10
ASE	(RWE	Schott	Solar)	 Germany 8
Kyocera	 Japan 5.5
BP	Solar	 U.K. 4.5
Photowatt	 France 2
Sharp	 Japan 2
Helios	 Italy 1.5
Top	9	total	production	as	%	Total 67.5
WORLD	TOTAL	PRODUCTION	(MW) 33.9
	
	
	
	
2001	
Sharp	 Japan 19.2
BP	Solar	 U.K	 13.9
Kyocera	 Japan 13.8
Shell	Solar	 Netherlands/UK 10.0
General	Electric	 U.S 6.7
Schott	Solar	 Germany 5.9
Sanyo	 Japan 4.9
Isofoton	 Spain 4.6
Photowatt	 France 3.6
Mitsubishi	 Japan 3.6
Top	10	total	production	as	%	Total 82.5%	
WORLD	TOTAL	PRODUCTION	(MW) 390.5
	
	
	
	
2006	
Sharp	 Japan 17.6
Q‐cells	 Germany 10.3
Kyocera	 Japan 7.3
Suntech	 China 6.5
Sanyo	 Japan 6.3
Mitsubishi	 Japan 4.5
Motech	 Taiwan 4.5
Schott	Solar	 Germany 3.9
BP	Solar	 U.K	 3.5
Shell	Solar	 Netherlands/UK 3.5
Top	10	total	production	 67.9
WORLD	TOTAL	PRODUCTION	(MW) 2,459
	
	
	
	
2011	
LDK	Solar	 China 10.2
Sharp	 Japan 9.5
Suntech	 China 8.1
First	Solar	 U.S 7.8
JA	Solar	 China 7.5
Canadian	Solar	 China	(Canadaregistered) 6.8
Trina	Solar	 China 6.4
Yingli	Solar	 China 5.8
Hanwha	Solar	 China 5.1
Jinto	Solar	 China 5.1
Top	10	total	production	 72.2
WORLD	TOTAL	PRODUCTION	(MW) 29,500
Sources: 
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Rankings for 1988:  estimates from I. Haller · H. Grupp, “Demand by product characteristics: measuring solar cell quality over 
time”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics. (2009) 19:487–506.  
1988 world capacity data: EPIA. 
2001 rankings: “PV REVIEW :World Solar PV Market Continues Explosive Growth”, ReFocU.S.,  September/October 2005, 
P18-22.  
2006 rankings: LEE Sung-Ho, KIM Jung-Woo, “Intensifying Competition for Technology in Northeast Asia”, SERI Quarterly, 
April 2011, p53-63. 
2011 ranking: Kari Williamson, “Trina Solar: A Chinese fortune company”, Renewable Energy FocU.S., September/October 
2011, P24-27. 
2006; 2011 world total capacity data: EPI. 
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